Oriana Skylar Mastro is a Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University where her research focuses on Chinese military and security policy, Asia-Pacific security issues, war termination, and coercive diplomacy. She is also a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, a former Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, and continues to serve in the United States Air Force Reserve for which she works as a strategic planner at INDOPACOM. For her contributions to U.S. strategy in Asia, she won the Individual Reservist of the Year Award in 2016. She has published widely, including in Foreign Affairs, International Security, International Studies Review, Journal of Strategic Studies, The Washington Quarterly, The National Interest, Survival, and Asian Security. Her book, The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime, (Cornell University Press, 2019), won the 2020 American Political Science Association International Security Section Best Book by an Untenured Faculty Member. She holds a B.A. in East Asian Studies from Stanford University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University. Her publications and other commentary can be found at www.orianaskylarmastro.com and on twitter @osmastro.
Today’s big issue is the ongoing war in Ukraine and China’s muted support for the Russian invasion. What do you think of the possibility that the Ukraine war is part of a larger Sino-Russian strategy to disrupt the Western-led order?
I am not a Russia specialist, so I cannot comment on what Russia wants to do, but I think China and Russia at least see eye to eye on the issue that the current world order is not beneficial to them. I think Russia wants to disrupt it, but China wants to reform it in more practical ways to benefit its interests. China does not value instability. If anything, they like the opposite. So, their approach is different in what they want in terms of Russia, but for now, at least, they can agree they do not like the current state of affairs.
The term ‘revisionist’ has often been applied to China. Would you say China is more of a revisionist power, looking to remake the world order and shift the balance of power?
I have never liked the word ‘revisionist’ because it’s not a very useful concept. It is a very subjective term. You can be revisionist, and it can be good. When the United States set up institutions after World War II, they revised the international order, but it was not bad. I think there is a difference in the process through which they try to revise things, whether it’s the United States or China. To be honest, I think what we are asking is not if China is revisionist. We are asking whether their preferences go against those of the United States’. Sometimes, China is going against the status quo; sometimes, it is not. Chinese writers often write about how revisionist the United States is, if you define revisionism as using force to resolve disputes. So, it depends on the process. Suppose China wants the power to do what it wants to do whenever it wants to and does not want to be constrained by outside actors; that’s a natural inclination. Most states don’t feel that way because it’s not a likely possibility.
What bearing do you think the Ukraine war has had on the Taiwan issue, specifically regarding military preparedness, especially in the face of questionable Western military support? What role does AUKUS have in said preparedness and the event of a possible invasion?
I do not see many of China’s viewpoints in terms of Western support. Even with Ukraine, the West was obvious that military support would not be forthcoming. During the crisis, the US made several statements making it clear to China that Taiwan is a different situation. Even as we are dealing with Ukraine, President Biden sent an unofficial delegation to Taiwan that made several statements on the USs’ commitment to defend Taiwan. So, the fact that we did not directly defend Ukraine, if anything, enhances deterrence against China because we would not have the capabilities to do both. So, ironically, if we had dedicated significant military capabilities to Ukraine, that probably would have encouraged China more concerning Taiwan because they know we would have been distracted elsewhere. In terms of China’s abilities, when we look at how the Russians are struggling, they are experiencing several deficiencies including command and control, embed operations, all in situations China had weaknesses in about ten years ago. When Xi Jinping came into power, he recognized that they had many fancy equipment but they lacked organizational structure and the human element necessary to try and win wars. He launched a major military reform campaign that addressed many of these issues. So, I do not think Russia’s struggles will tell us anything about how the Chinese will perform. If anything, China has the organizational structure to support clear command and control, and joint integrated operations, and Xi Jinping has made it very clear that military leaders get promoted based on reported success. All these things are so that we know that the Chinese military is much better prepared to fight a complex war than the Russians seem to be.
Would you say the war has bolstered or discouraged China from considering a Taiwan invasion? Should the Russo-Ukraine War serve as a warning to Taiwan?
I do not think China has learned anything new. There’s no updating the available information, especially about their capabilities and resolve, and the United States’ capabilities and resolve. They do not feel more cautious and what this can teach us is that countries are willing to use force to get what they want. So, all those people who were trying to doubt if Xi Jinping would ever use force over Taiwan, I hope they reconsider that assessment because when it comes down to it, leaders always choose core national interests over everything else. I think that is being displayed here.
What do you think the impact of a Russia-China partnership will be on US-China engagement?
I do not think we will see a full-on partnership, especially if you talk about a traditional symmetric military alliance. But I think Russia, at the most, will support China as a logistic hub and strategic rear, and even that complicates what the United States can do in a Taiwan scenario. The United States would not want to attack the Russian forces that supply the Chinese over land, whether it is critical war materials like oil or weapons systems; even if they are flying their patrols to defend their territory in Asia that could free up Chinese forces to move against the United States. A traditional symmetric military alliance will be a problem if the United States must face both countries simultaneously.
Is that not always a possibility, even remotely? That China and Russia might decide to take on the United States together or simultaneously?
If it happens, they will do it very badly. They do not have any sort of embed liaisons and cannot use each other’s equipment. So, there’s always a possibility that it a Sino-Russia partnership may happen if a war breaks out, but without peacetime preparations, this type of alliance will be much less effective.
What will be the US’s recourse to a Sino-Russia Partnership?
It will be easier for the US to tackle China and Russia than China by itself. Because when you have China and Russia together, it becomes a severe threat to democracy. Then all countries that limited the China issue to Taiwan would be forced to reconsider their reticence. So, does the UK want to do anything right now, does Germany? No. But when this becomes more of an existential threat for them, I think US allies and partners will probably provide much more military support to the United States. If we have military support from allies and partners, we will win every time. The issue is that right now, countries do not want to let us operate from their territories. They are not going to fight with us. Therefore, it is very much a US-China scenario. But if it is China and Russia together, then US partners and allies will rally because it becomes more of an existential threat and not solely limited to the Taiwan issue.
Deterrence, as a strategy, has been vilified for its efficacy since the Russo-Ukraine war began. How do we rethink deterrence as a plausible strategy within the context of the ongoing war, and what impact has it had, if any, on US-China strategic relationship?
Well, I think the fact that we failed to deter Putin highlights what we already knew: deterrence is hard. I believe that with conventional parity between China and the United States, especially technologically, it becomes tough to deter China either by punishment or denial. But it also highlights how critical it is because war is so costly that it makes sense, in peacetime, to spend much money to deter. After all, it is always better to have “wasted” that money on a military you don’t need than to try and deter when you are fighting a war. It also highlights the urgency of figuring out how to improve the US military decisions vis-a-vis China to convince them not to take Taiwan by force, even though we could never persuade them not to do so. Even if we do persuade them, they are not going to decide not to do it today. They could choose not to do it right now, or they could decide not to do it in perpetuity, which is also like deciding not to take Taiwan at all. Either way, deterrence is hard. As far as US-China strategic relationship goes, it is serving the purpose of maintaining the status quo. However, I do not think the Russo-Ukranian war impacts China’s thinking on Taiwan at all. I wrote a piece in Foreign Affairs a couple of weeks ago called “Invasion is not contagious,”. The Russo-Ukraine war is not a portent of things to come in China-Taiwan relations.
If we hear that China has invaded Taiwan tomorrow morning, what do you think will be the US’s first five moves?
I mean, I know what we say we will do, which is we will immediately start pouring forces into the region to support the defense of Taiwan. We would use the forces we already have in the region as the initial attack. We just can never predict what a leader would decide in the moment.
If the US does act militarily, what happens to the One China policy?
I have argued elsewhere that even if the United States wins, the best we can hope for is a reversion to the status quo. Because if the US wins and what we ask for in terms of war termination is an independent Taiwan, then China will never stop fighting. So, if we want to do this smartly, then the One China policy should remain, even if we win that war.
So, am I hearing that the sweet spot in US-Taiwan-China diplomatic relations will be a revision to the status quo, if the status quo changes?
The problem is, at least from a US perspective, that the revision China wants is so contrary to our interests that we are better off fighting a war than accommodating. I do not think there is necessarily a diplomatic space for that. The Chinese have conceptualized their interests in such a way that the United States cannot really accommodate them.
What do you think would be the most suitable diplomatic compromise on the Taiwan issue?
What we have been doing for the past seventy or seventy-nine years is correct. As long as we maintain the status quo, it is a success. So, that’s deterrence. No one is happy, no one is getting what they want, but it is better than war. So, I think that’s what we are trying to do with diplomacy; to maintain the status quo.
So far, how has the ongoing war affected the US’s China foreign policy, including military preparedness surrounding activities in the Taiwan strait?
The US military has prioritized China and Asia; Ukraine does not change that. But you can only do so much, and it is not like you can hasten things. I think everything is proceeding exactly as it would have before Ukraine. Because we are not militarily involved in Ukraine, we do not have to divert many resources, so the war has not impacted military preparedness in the Indo-pacific.
What’s the worst-case scenario for US-Taiwan-China relations in the context of the Ukraine war? What’s the absolute worst news we could wake up to tomorrow? How can we guard against it?
I think, in general, the worst situation is if we are fighting a war against Russia and China at the same time. So, not with Ukraine, but if Russia attacks a NATO partner or if China attacks Taiwan, we will have a challenging time doing both at the same time. I think that would be a nightmare scenario. Nevertheless, even if it is harder to face both countries simultaneously, as I said, we have more forces, and we have European and Asian allies. So, China, by joining forces with Russia, we will focus on defeating China first because we have more forces to do so before turning to Russia, which may be challenging. However, it will be worse for China to fight that war – against the United States with its partners and allies – than to fight one against the United States alone. So, we must make them think about it, so that they are unwilling to coordinate with Russia.
What rhetoric/narratives are you hearing from China’s neighbors on a possible Taiwan invasion? Where will their loyalties lie?
Well, that’s the thing, China has territorial disputes with countries besides Taiwan as an offshore island. It is not like China will invade the rest of Japan or Australia. This is also why the Chinese threat seems relatively limited compared to Russia. Russia wants to expand territories into other countries. Of course, it bothers them when China claims certain waterways as territorial waters and things like that, but there’s no expectation that China will try to occupy Tokyo, for instance.
In an ideal world, what would you like to have happen?
I mean, that everything stays the same. I mean, that’s the only thing that can happen. China is never going to give up on Taiwan. So even in an ideal world, I don’t think we can say that much. The status quo is the best we can hope for. If we strive for anything different, I think that’s how you get wars.
Could you tell us a little more about your background? What path led you to the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and why the focus on Chinese Military and Security Policy?
The most important takeaway from all this is that I never really decided on a path. I have always done research on things I found interesting and enjoyable. As much as possible, I am someone who likes to have control over my own life and destiny, so the idea of working my way up through a system by hoping that I can attach my cart to the right horse was never appealing to me. I always thought it would be better to be the horse. So, I just felt that if I continued to pursue interesting and important things, no matter where I ended up, I would never have any regrets about the work that I did. If I worked hard and did my best at whatever I did and continued to redefine what my best was; If I got better and better, I would continue to enjoy the things I work on. I have been lucky enough that people are attracted to that, and I have been able to get jobs doing these things. My path was not so straightforward that I knew I could make a career of being a Chinese military specialist. I just followed one thing and other things. There was never a decision. It was me finding out what the next new thing I could do was because, honestly, if I had done things just for a career, I would have done things very differently. For one, I would have read and written constantly about the same things so that I am not always learning new stuff, but that would not be as interesting either.
Is having a passion for this field enough to make a career out of it?
Passion is important in that, I think, in general, it would give you the endurance and grit needed to develop the skills to succeed, but you do need skill because passion is not enough even though it is what sustains you through studying Chinese or military service and duty in less-than-ideal circumstances.
