Taiwan’s predicament is constantly shifting. Since the Trump-Xi summit, questions have surfaced around whether the U.S. will resume arms sales to Taiwan. Other actors in the region have made remarks about their own interests in cross-strait relations, while the impact of a conflict on the island would have disastrous effects for the world economy. At the same time, Taiwan’s domestic politics are divided in many ways about the correct approach to China. To unpack the many players shaping Taiwan’s future, the Monitor spoke with Ryan Hass.
Ryan Hass is director of the John L. Thornton China Center and the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies at Brookings. He is also a senior fellow in the Center for Asia Policy Studies. He was part of the inaugural class of David M. Rubenstein fellows at Brookings, and is a nonresident affiliated fellow in the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School. From 2013 to 2017, Hass served as the director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia at the National Security Council (NSC) staff. In that role, he advised President Obama and senior White House officials on all aspects of U.S. policy toward China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, and coordinated the implementation of U.S. policy toward this region among U.S. government departments and agencies.
He joined President Obama’s state visit delegations in Beijing and Washington respectively in 2014 and 2015, and the president’s delegation to Hangzhou, China, for the G-20 in 2016, and to Lima, Peru, for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Meetings in 2016. Prior to joining NSC, Hass served as a Foreign Service Officer in U.S. Embassy Beijing, where he earned the State Department Director General’s award for impact and originality in reporting, an award given annually to the officer whose reporting had the greatest impact on the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. Hass also served in Embassy Seoul and Embassy Ulaanbaatar, and domestically in the State Department Offices of Taiwan Coordination and Korean Affairs. Hass received multiple Superior Honor and Meritorious Honor commendations during his 15-year tenure in the Foreign Service.
Emma Brignall: I’d like to start with Taiwan’s security and defense. With the delay in the United States providing Taiwan with its most recent arms sale, what are some of the implications for Taiwan’s security?
Ryan Hass: The most significant long-term implication I see is that Taiwan’s willingness to invest in its own defense is correlated with its perception of America’s commitment to Taiwan’s security. In other words, if America is seen as wavering in its willingness to stand firmly in support of Taiwan, it raises doubts and political headwinds in Taiwan about investing in its own defense. That’s the long tail of what we saw with President Trump’s statements after he returned from Beijing in May.
Overall, I think Taiwan is making sound investments in its defense at the moment. It is increasing its investments in asymmetric capabilities that take advantage of its unique geography. The U.S.-Taiwan security relationship is robust on the ground. There is a bit of a paradox in that President Trump’s high-level signals suggest a certain ambivalence about standing firmly in defense of Taiwan, whereas much of the activity on the ground is significant and meaningful. The space to watch is whether perceptions in Taiwan shift regarding America’s steadfastness on Taiwan’s security. If they do, that may affect Taiwan’s willingness to invest in its own defense going forward.
EB: You mentioned asymmetric capabilities versus arms sales. Can Taiwan’s defense measures actually prevent an invasion, or are arms sales a better deterrent because of the symbolic support they represent rather than their actual capabilities?
RH: This is an age-old debate that has been going on for a long time. It’s a good question. My own view—and I welcome pushback—is that it’s important for Taiwan to do everything in its power to strengthen its ability to protect its people. That’s an obligation of government. Beijing has been unequivocal and consistent in expressing its ambition to integrate and ultimately annex Taiwan so that it is unified with the People’s Republic of China.
How the people of Taiwan respond to that unwavering expression of Chinese ambition is a matter of choice. My understanding of public sentiment in Taiwan is that a significant majority prefer the status quo: no war and self-governance in Taiwan. They prefer Taiwan’s democratic system and want to preserve it. If that is the case, Taiwan needs to focus its resources on how best to do so. My judgment is that Taiwan needs real capabilities for defense, not just symbols of defense. Investment in asymmetric capabilities is meaningful, important, and irreplaceable for Taiwan’s ability to protect itself and its future.
EB: I also want to ask about domestic politics. KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun has taken a more appeasing approach toward Beijing. Do you think this will be more effective at deterring Beijing than a defense buildup?
RH: Ultimately, that is a question for the people of Taiwan to decide in their upcoming elections. This has been a longstanding debate in Taiwan about the best way to protect the island. People who are more supportive of pan-blue approaches believe that lowering tensions with Beijing increases space for Taiwan to protect itself and preserve the status quo.
People who are more supportive of pan-green and the DPP tend to believe that China has an insatiable appetite for Taiwan, that there is no amount of appeasement that would satisfy Beijing’s ambitions, and that the best way for Taiwan to protect itself is by drawing closer to the United States, Japan, and other international partners.
I would situate Chairwoman Cheng’s comments within that longstanding debate. She resides at a deeper blue end of a spectrum of views about the best way to protect Taiwan.
EB: You mentioned the upcoming elections. Do you think there’s increasing support for this approach toward Beijing, given that the DPP has held the presidency for the past decade? Could that be likely to change soon?
RH: I wish I knew the answer. Setting aside Taiwan for a second and thinking about political systems, it is unique in an advanced industrial democracy such as Taiwan for a single party to maintain power for three consecutive elections and if they were to hold on for a fourth, that would be a remarkable political achievement. We don’t yet know who the candidates will be, so it’s difficult to forecast what is going to happen in the 2028 presidential election with any degree of confidence. I do expect that it will be a contested election.
The 2028 election may be different from the previous election in the sense that the previous election had three main political candidates. I expect the 2028 election will only have two. And so, the 26 percent of the Taiwan public that voted for the TPP and Ko Wen-je — where they go and who they support will be determinative of the outcome of the election. The 26% of people who supported Ko Wen-je in 2024 were largely young people who felt dissatisfied with the status quo, economically alienated, and wanted to shake things up. Whichever candidate best speaks to those sentiments and desires will have a strong chance of prevailing in the 2028 election.
EB: How is approval for the current president, Lai Ching-te, among Taiwanese voters, especially after he narrowly managed to push through an increased defense budget?
RH: President Lai’s approval ratings have fluctuated during his tenure. His theory of the case is that he can cultivate close relations with the United States and other international partners as a bulwark against Chinese encroachment on Taiwan.
This pitch is challenged by President Trump’s very public ambivalence regarding America’s responsibility to stand firmly shoulder-to-shoulder with Taiwan. I think President Lai’s approval ratings have been impacted by that. They’ve also been impacted by internal developments within Taiwan, such as the failed recall effort against KMT legislators.
EB: Continuing with Taiwan’s relations with the United States, President Trump has proposed the idea of a call with President Lai. What diplomatic measures can the United States take to improve relations with Taiwan beyond arms sales? Do you see more direct conversations as a possibility?
RH: I do not expect President Trump to call President Lai or for the United States to pursue formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan in the near future. That said, there are meaningful, practical, and mutually beneficial ways that Washington could strengthen relations with Taiwan. One example would be to pass a double-taxation treaty so companies operating in both the United States and Taiwan would not have to pay taxes twice. This has particular significance because the United States is very committed to attracting Taiwanese businesses to invest and produce in America, in high-end manufacturing but more specifically advanced semiconductor producers. If this legislation were passed, I believe it would have a measurable impact on improving the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Oftentimes in Washington there is a lot of emphasis on arms sales as the measure of the health of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Arms sales are important, but they are not the defining feature of the relationship.
The reality is that the United States will not be able to achieve its economic ambitions without a healthy and robust relationship with Taiwan. Taiwan produces the inputs upon which America’s AI revolution rests, and there is no substitute. As an American who cares deeply about our future and the future of my children, I want to see a healthy, robust relationship between the United States and Taiwan. I do worry, however, that President Trump places less value on that relationship than others do.
EB: Do you think efforts to bring TSMC production to Arizona, for example, will strengthen those ties, or could they cause concern that the United States is simply trying to reduce its dependence on Taiwan geographically?
RH: I know there is sensitivity around the perception that the United States is trying to “hollow out” Taiwan by shifting Taiwan’s production capacity for advanced semiconductor production to the United States. I don’t see it as an either-or proposition. I see it as both-and.
There is no way that the United States would succeed if its goal was to transfer Taiwan’s entire semiconductor ecosystem from Taiwan to the United States. That is a physical impossibility. At the same time, if the United States creates conditions that are conducive for TSMC and other leading semiconductor companies to see it in their interest to produce closer to their customers in the United States even as they continue to expand capacity in Taiwan, that would be a win-win. It would serve both sides’ interests and it would provide ballast and momentum for the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
EB: We’ve also seen an uptick in outspoken comments from Taiwan’s neighbors, including Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi and President Marcos of the Philippines. What are the implications for Taiwan and the potential for conflict in the region?
RH: I think President Lai would like to create a perception of solidarity throughout the First Island Chain, stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. He would also like the United States to be vested within that community of actors committed to sustaining the status quo. To the extent that there is a perception of solidarity, I think that benefits President Lai.
At the same time, it is a source of acute sensitivity in Beijing. Beijing would like to deal with Taiwan as an internal affair and deal one-on-one between Beijing and Taipei, rather than a perception of having to deal with a whole region at once over issues related to Taiwan. As a result, I expect Beijing to continue aggressive efforts to discourage and deter other actors from expressing support and solidarity with Taiwan. The more confidence Beijing has in its position and in its capacity to get President Trump to step back from Taiwan, the more aggressive it is likely to become in pushing back against Tokyo and Manila. The message from Beijing will be: President Trump has recognized the shifting balance of power; it’s time for Tokyo and Manila to recognize it as well.
EB: Taiwan has few formal allies. Even just flying through a country without formal relations has proved difficult for President Lai recently. What benefits does Taiwan gain from its few allies and what is China trying to do about it?
RH: You’re absolutely right that Taiwan has few formal diplomatic partners. Those relationships matter because they keep the Republic of China alive as a political entity if other countries have formal diplomatic recognition of it. If Taiwan were to lose all its formal diplomatic allies, it could create a crisis. I’m not sure it’s a crisis that would serve the interests of either Taipei or Beijing, because it would force a decision in Taipei about whether Taiwan should declare itself as a new political entity rather than the Republic of China, which has existed for a very long time. If it were to create a new political entity, what would it be? Would it have any connection to China? These would be very difficult and uncomfortable discussions and decisions.
For that reason, I don’t think it serves either side’s interest for Taiwan to be pushed to zero formal diplomatic partners around the world. However, Beijing uses pressure on Taiwan’s formal diplomatic allies and its efforts to reduce their numbers as a way of signaling to the people of Taiwan that they are isolated and that their future rests with Beijing, not apart from it. That is the significance of this ongoing diplomatic battle for Taiwan’s formal partnerships.