Fear, Competition, and U.S.-China Relations w/ Zhengyu Huang

Rethinking China, Rethinking America
Nissen Workersassemblingmotorcycles 2007

Workers assembling motorcycles in a Zongshen Industrial Group factory. Chongqing, China. 2007. Source.

Is China truly an existential threat to the United States? Are tariffs and technological restrictions making America stronger—or weakening its long-term competitiveness? And how should Washington balance national security concerns with openness and innovation? In this interview, Chinese-American scholar and author of Rethinking ChinaChallenging Our Economic Assumptions & Opportunities for Lasting Prosperity Zhengyu Huang reflects on the assumptions shaping U.S.–China policy at a time of deepening tensions between the two countries. Drawing on data, case studies, and years of research, he argues that many dominant narratives about China deserve closer scrutiny and that America’s response to China ultimately says as much about the United States as it does about Beijing.

Juan Zhang (JZ): What was your primary motivation for publishing this book at a time when China-U.S. relations have hit a multi-decade low and tensions remain high?

Zhengyu Huang (ZH): I wrote Rethinking China to challenge the assumptions driving U.S.–China policy. Too often, our decisions have been reactive and shaped by emotion, producing outcomes that don’t serve American interests.

The stakes are simply too high to rely on inherited narratives or untested claims. This book takes a data-driven, results-focused approach and asks a basic question: what actually works? If we want better outcomes—economically, socially, and in terms of national security—we need strategies grounded in evidence, not rhetoric.

One of the central points of the book is that the current climate of hysteria around China is already costing us—eroding our values, weakening our competitiveness, and increasing the risk of conflict.

My goal is to move the conversation beyond political talking points and toward outcomes. Not what sounds tough, but what delivers results. Ultimately, I hope to contribute to a future where the U.S. remains secure, innovative, and confident—while avoiding unnecessary confrontation.

JZ: While your book is titled Rethinking China, you mention that it is also a “book about America.” What do you mean by that?

ZH: At its core, this is a book about how America makes decisions—especially under pressure.

The U.S.–China relationship is often framed as a geopolitical contest, but it is also a test of who we are. Our policies reflect not just how we see China, but how we understand ourselves—our values, our institutions, and our confidence in our own system.

For a decade, much of U.S. policy has been built on widely repeated claims that have rarely been scrutinized. I wrote this book to test those claims empirically—and in many cases, the results were surprising.

Rethinking China asks straightforward but uncomfortable questions:

  • When we say China steals $600 billion of IP annually, where does that number come from?
  • When we describe IP theft as state-sponsored, what does the actual case data show?
  • When we attribute job losses to China, what does the evidence say about the underlying drivers?

Ultimately, this is about ensuring that our values are not just stated—but effective. A system proves itself not through rhetoric, but through results.

JZ: You argue that many current U.S. policies toward China are built on “false assumptions.” Which assumption is the most dangerous?

ZH: If I had to identify the most dangerous assumption, it is the belief that China represents a singular, existential threat across all domains—and should therefore be confronted everywhere, all at once.

That framing asks the wrong question. It’s not whether China is a threat, but what kind of threat—and where. Different challenges require different responses.

I often use a simple analogy: if a category 5 hurricane is coming, you evacuate. If it’s a category 1, you secure your home. The problem today is that everything is treated like a category 6 hurricane, and our responses become uncalibrated and often counterproductive.

This matters because, as I argue in the book, China is a measurable threat—but the larger danger is how we respond. When policy is driven by fear rather than facts, we adopt broad measures that can undermine our own strengths.

We already see this dynamic. Overgeneralized assumptions lead to restrictions that limit collaboration, discourage talent, and weaken the openness that has historically powered American innovation.

At the same time, this mindset feeds a deeper strategic risk: a self-reinforcing security dilemma, where each side sees itself as defensive and the other as aggressive. That cycle is difficult to break—and history shows where it can lead.

The real danger is not competition itself, but misdiagnosing its nature—and responding in ways that weaken us while increasing the risk of conflict.

JZ: The trade deficit has become a central focus again. How effective are tariffs in narrowing it and reshoring industry?

ZH: The trade deficit is often used as a shorthand for American weakness—but in the book, I argue that this is an incomplete and sometimes misleading lens.

At its peak integration in 2022, the U.S. imported roughly $564 billion from China. But at the same time, American companies operating inside China generated about $471 billion in revenue. When you take both sides into account, you’re looking at a deeply integrated economic relationship of roughly $1.2 trillion.

Focusing only on imports creates a distorted picture. It can lead to policies that appear to reduce dependence, but may in fact constrain the global operations of American firms.

The paradox is this: in trying to “win” on trade metrics, we may be limiting the reach and competitiveness of our own most innovative companies.

JZ: In sectors like semiconductors and AI, how can the U.S. protect national security without stifling innovation?

ZH: In Rethinking China, I argue that the United States risks weakening its own competitiveness when national security concerns are defined too broadly or based on flawed assumptions.

In sectors like semiconductors and AI, the risks are real. But when responses are not narrowly targeted and evidence-based, they can become counterproductive.

The consequences go beyond economics. Broad restrictions can limit collaboration, reduce talent flows, and accelerate decoupling—undermining the foundations of U.S. innovation. More importantly, they can distract from the real challenge: global competition for talent and the rise of capable competitors.

America’s enduring advantage has been its ability to attract the world’s best minds and to lead through openness. Policies that discourage collaboration or alienate key communities—especially scientists and researchers—ultimately weaken that advantage.

The more effective approach is precision: clearly define genuine risks, apply targeted safeguards, and maintain openness elsewhere. The goal is not just protection, but preserving the system that makes innovation possible.

JZ: Do you see current U.S.–China relations as a “New Cold War”?

ZH: I don’t. And I think that framing is both misleading and risky.

What we are seeing is better understood as a security dilemma—a dynamic where each side views its own actions as defensive and the other’s as aggressive, creating a cycle of mistrust and escalation.

The Cold War analogy encourages binary thinking—democracy versus autocracy—which can oversimplify a far more complex relationship. As history shows, that kind of framing can lead to poor assumptions and constrained policy choices.

Today’s relationship is better described as intense but interdependent competition, shaped by mutual suspicion and increasingly limited room for maneuver.

JZ: As a Chinese-American scholar, how has your background shaped your perspective?

ZH: My background has shaped less what I think and more how I approach the problem.

Being situated between two systems has made me attentive to how assumptions form—and how quickly they harden into accepted truths. Much of Rethinking China is an effort to interrogate those narratives and examine the underlying evidence more rigorously.

It also makes the consequences more visible. Policy narratives are not abstract—they affect real people. They shape public perception, academic collaboration, and even civil liberties. Mischaracterizations of China can translate into mistrust toward Chinese American communities, which ultimately weakens social cohesion and national strength.

So my goal is not to “bridge” in a superficial sense, but to bring analytical clarity—questioning assumptions, grounding debates in evidence, and focusing on outcomes rather than rhetoric.

Topic: American Politics, Chinese Economy, Chinese Politics, U.S.-China