When China Rules the Rivers

Chinese Prime Minister Li Qiang recently announced the “Project of the Century.” Interestingly, he was not referring to the exploration of the dark side of the Moon, sending a manned mission to Mars, or even the so-called “reunification” with Taiwan—the ultimate crown jewel in President Xi Jinping’s “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Instead, Li was speaking about the largest river dam project in world history.

Indeed, calling it the “Project of the Century” is no exaggeration. One could compare it to a modern-day Great Wall in terms of scale, ambition, and associated cost. China plans to construct the largest dam in the world on the Yarlung Tsangpo, which originates in the Tibetan Plateau. Upon entering India, the river is known as the Siang before it turns into the Brahmaputra River further downstream. The new mega-dam project is designed to generate three times the electric power capacity of the Three Gorges Dam—currently the largest dam on Earth. This massive ten-year project is expected to cost a staggering 1.2 trillion yuan (approximately US$ 167.8 billion).

The historic mega-dam project is highly controversial, to say the least. In fact, environmental concerns are only a part of a larger geopolitical and geo-economic picture.

Water, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama

The management of water resources originating in the “roof of the world” is intrinsically linked to the so-called “Tibetan issue.” The Dalai Lama, spiritual leader to most Tibetan Buddhists, recently celebrated his 90th birthday in Dharamshala in northern India. The Buddhist leader has lived there in exile since 1959, following a failed uprising against Chairman Mao Zedong’s People’s Republic of China (PRC).

For the Tibetan diaspora, the Dalai Lama’s 90th birthday provided an opportunity to revive global awareness of the Tibetan issue. It encompasses not only political matters but also people’s livelihoods, the preservation of Tibetan culture, and environmental concerns related to global climate change.

For years, the Dalai Lama has urged environmental protection in Tibet. He has criticized Beijing’s projects, arguing that Tibet’s natural environment should be managed by the local people, as “Tibetans know Tibet better.” This aligns with the Dalai Lama’s “Middle Way” approach, which calls for respect for the autonomy which had officially been granted to the region by Beijing in 1965. While the Chinese authorities have accused him of separatism, the Tibetan leader long ago abandoned the push for independence—accepting a compromise aimed at normalizing life for Tibetan people under the PRC rule.

The new mega-dam will inevitably affect local communities. For comparison, the Three Gorges Dam was to create one million jobs, yet an even higher number of people is estimated to have lost their homes. This time, the scale may be smaller, but there will still be many “dam migrants” that will need to be relocated by the government. While Beijing insists that the lives of such “dam migrants” improve after resettlement, various NGOs have repeatedly warned of increased poverty risks. Destruction of religious sites—deeply important to local communities—is another flashpoint. In the past, protests were quickly suppressed by the Chinese authorities.

For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), however, all these concerns seem secondary. From its perspective, much larger and more important goals are at stake.

Where Water Meets Ideology

For Chinese authorities, managing water resources in Tibet is not just about engineering and infrastructure—it is also a way to assert sovereignty over the region. This issue seems so sensitive in CCP ideology that it may be rivaled only by the goal of unification with Taiwan. In other words, Tibet’s water resources are part of a broader strategy for maintaining control over the snow-capped highland region. Thus, any criticism can trigger a barrage of strong, hostile reactions from Beijing, as the CCP views it as a challenge to its sovereignty over Tibet.

This has happened repeatedly in the past—especially when criticism of China’s water infrastructure projects has come from the United States. In such cases, China has often accused the United States of colluding with “the Dalai Lama clique” to “attack and smear China’s water resources development and utilization” on the Tibetan Plateau, as well as of spreading “unscientific and fabricated” rhetoric.

Yet, there are serious concerns that can—and should—be raised in an independent, non-political manner. From an environmental standpoint, the construction of a mega-dam will irreversibly alter the natural landscape; there is no “Ctrl + Z” option to undo such a project once it is completed. Moreover, deforestation and pollution are common side effects. On top of that, the mega-dam will be built in a seismically active area. For that reason, some experts have even suggested that Beijing should reconsider its ambitious plans.

The list of concerns does not end there. After all, this is not merely a domestic issue: the mega-dam will have profound consequences for two downstream countries: India and Bangladesh.

Weaponizing Water?

What makes the new mega-dam an extraordinary challenge is that it is being built on a transboundary river. Simply put, whatever China does upstream will have direct effects downstream in India and Bangladesh. Worried about China’s real intentions and the potential consequences of manipulating shared water resources, the Chief Minister of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh called the dam a “water bomb.”

While such language is dramatic, filled with emotionally laden terms and metaphors, the overall concerns seem justified. To certain extent, China will have the ability to restrict or release the water flow—potentially drying out or flooding territories downstream. There are also fears that Beijing could divert Yarlung Tsangpo water into its US$70 billion multi-decade South-North Water Transfer Project—the largest hydrological scheme in history, which transfers water from China’s wetter southern region to the arid north.

Past incidents suggest that Beijing may have already been “testing the waters.” In 2017, China withheld hydrological data from India, leaving it unprepared for a Brahmaputra flood. Beijing claimed that its monitoring stations were under maintenance; therefore, no data could be shared. Reportedly, however, Beijing did share data with China-friendly Bangladesh. Many experts saw this as a retaliation for the China-India Doklam standoff earlier that year. If this were truly a matter of strategic calculus, Beijing’s action would reveal a dangerous possibility: the use of water as a weapon against other countries.

Other concerning cases come from the Mekong River, a lifeline for the Southeast Asian nations. Several times, China lowered the water level without prior warning, disrupting farming, fishing, and transportation in the Mekong Basin. While some experts argue that “turning off” the taps on the Brahmaputra would not have the same effect due to different geo-hydrological conditions (as 80% of the river’s flow emerges within Indian territory), it would still have an impact—though one that is difficult to assess today.

Destined for a Water War?

India is not sitting idle. It has reportedly decided to speed up construction of a giant dam in Arunachal Pradesh—a territory that China claims as the southern tip of Tibet. This overlap of disputed borders, ideology, and water-sharing has created a volatile and potentially dangerous mix in geopolitical and geo-economic relations. Despite recent efforts to normalize China-India relations during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, no real breakthrough can be expected in the foreseeable future as long as this issue continues to hang over Beijing–New Delhi relations like the sword of Damocles.

In this light, “water war” is more than just a clickbait. Nonetheless, cooperative frameworks could help prevent the worst outcomes, though they are difficult to achieve. The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan is a rare example of agreement between adversaries. Yet, even that has frayed: New Delhi recently put it “in abeyance”—an ambiguous term suggesting a temporary suspension without clear conditions—amid renewed tensions. While India is not currently capable of fully blocking the flow of water to Pakistan, the move highlights how easily water can be politicized and weaponized, especially under domestic pressure.

Moreover, some may argue that New Delhi’s decision dangerously undermines its moral standing to criticize China’s hydrological projects in Tibet. In other words, India’s move is a double-edged sword—one that Beijing could use in future rhetoric to dismiss Indian objections to what is being done with the Himalayan headwaters.

Playing with Fire—or Playing with Water?

Two centuries ago, the world saw a gold rush; in the era of global climate change, we may now see a “water rush.” Glaciers and ice sheets are melting, weather patterns are shifting, and droughts and wildfires are spreading. In these conditions, securing fresh water is a matter of national security. This is precisely what China is doing while also boosting its energy production in the Himalayas. This way, Beijing is killing two birds with one stone—quenching its hunger for power and thirst for water.

Importantly, however, China is not destined to weaponize water against downstream countries. Through transparency, cooperation, and dialogue, it is possible to establish a peaceful management system or a cooperative framework for transboundary water resources. Of course, there is a strong temptation to use water as a tool of political and economic pressure on those living along the lower stretches of transboundary rivers. Whether as a means of coercion against countries with which China has disputes, like India, or as leverage over smaller downstream nations in Southeast Asia, water remains a powerful resource—arguably more powerful than oil or gas, since civilization itself cannot survive without it.

China knows it holds a great geo-hydrological power; the question is whether it will abuse it—contradicting President Xi’s own calls for promoting “peace, development, equity, justice, democracy and freedom.” One way or another, the Himalayan water drama has only just begun.