Is Trump Trying to Align with Russia Against China?

Hu Wei is famous political scientist in China. On March 5, 2022, less than three weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he wrote the essay  “Possible Outcomes of the Russo-Ukrainian War and China’s Choice” which attracted international attention. At the third anniversary of the war, he published a commentary called “Against Trumpism”. The following translation is from one section of the commentary. The translation was completed by Juan Zhang.

It is likely a misjudgment that Trump is leaning toward Putin to counter China.

For certain anti-China figures, despite their deep dissatisfaction—even outright frustration—with Trump’s proposed peace plan to end the Russo-Ukraine war, they persist in the belief that he is executing a grand strategic maneuver, seeking to align with Russia in a concerted effort to counter China. Clinging to this conviction, they continue to rally behind him, holding onto a final glimmer of hope. Yet, in the end, their expectations are destined to be met with disappointment.

Trump advocates for a multipolar world. Without the cooperation of both China and Russia, this multipolar vision remains a mere fantasy. This means not only acknowledging China’s status as a major power—one of the essential poles in this framework—but also strengthening coordination with China on international affairs. Within this framework, China and the U.S. will inevitably have conflicts, particularly over economic interests, where Trump will likely take a tougher stance. However, this does not mean irreconcilable rivalry. This stands in stark contrast to Biden’s strategy, which frames U.S.-China competition as a battle between democracy and authoritarianism, declaring that the decisive decade (2022-2032) will determine which system prevails. Biden’s national strategy is to “outcompete China” through alliances, making it a zero-sum game. Trump, on the other hand, sees a path of coexistence.

As U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio bluntly stated in a recent interview with Megyn Kelly, multipolarity is already a reality: “We are currently living in a multipolar world, with the U.S. and China as key players.” He emphasized that in this new world, “China will do what is in China’s best interests… and the U.S. needs to do what is in its best interests.” Rubio also stated that multipolarity “does not mean abandoning our principles… but foreign policy is always about working for national interests, even if it sometimes requires cooperating with people we wouldn’t invite to dinner or necessarily admire.” The day after the interview, he published an op-edin The Wall Street Journal further elaborating on this pragmatic, interest-driven approach to foreign policy rather than one based on ideological utopianism.

From the perspective of Trumpism, in a multipolar world, the U.S. should prioritize its own national interests rather than focusing on maintaining the “liberal world order” it once led—an order that allowed China to emerge as a major beneficiary. This means the U.S. will relinquish its self-imposed responsibilities toward the rest of the world, hence Trump’s repeated withdrawals from international agreements. While Rubio remains a staunch anti-China figure and denies that a multipolar world benefits China, his departure from Biden’s strategy of forming an anti-China alliance objectively serves China’s interests. If China does not face a multilateral containment strategy, it can hold its own. In a multipolar framework, direct confrontation between China and the U.S. would only lead to mutual destruction. Both nations will need to cooperate based on their respective interests. The logic of great-power politics often dictates that major powers sacrifice smaller nations for their own benefit rather than engage in self-destructive zero-sum conflicts.

It is clear that Trump is not a strategist, and his primary focus is not foreign policy but domestic politics. Trump aspires to be a leader worshipped by the masses, and anyone who helps him achieve this goal is his friend. The moment he took office in 2017, he dismantled the “Pivot to Asia” and “Two-Ocean Strategy” carefully crafted by the U.S. establishment to contain China—actions that clearly do not align with a strategy to counter China. “America First” and “Make America Great Again” are, at their core, about reviving the U.S. economy so that the American people admire and revere him, cementing his legacy. He has no fixed principles, only interests. If China can help him achieve his goals, he would be willing to cooperate. However, Trump is also a man of strong emotions and holds grudges. The only question is whether China can meet his expectations.

Under Trump’s vision of multipolarity, the world would enter a “jungle society” of great-power politics. The U.S.-Europe alliance would collapse, and there would be no solid China-Russia alliance either. The U.S., China, and Russia would each operate independently, competing and cooperating in a system of global co-governance. Meanwhile, the U.S. would seek to maximize its power and gains. Trump’s attempts to acquire Greenland, assert control over Canada, reclaim the Panama Canal, and withdraw from various international organizations align with this logic, as he aims to further consolidate America’s dominance as one of the global poles. He would gradually shed the burden of maintaining the liberal international order, potentially even exiting NATO, forcing Europe toward strategic autonomy, while Japan moves toward remilitarization. Eventually, the post-World War II United Nations framework could collapse entirely, giving way to a “new order” of multipolarity.

Of course, this may well be Trump’s wishful thinking. I believe he lacks the capability to fundamentally alter the global structure and the post-war international order. Russia, given its current power, also struggles to sustain itself as a global pole. Whether China chooses to cooperate with him remains uncertain. Moreover, even if Trump does manage to shift the global landscape, multipolar great-power politics are inherently unstable and difficult to maintain in equilibrium, with high risks of instability. If Trump leaves office, it is likely that both U.S. domestic and foreign policy will revert to the traditional path.

Hu Wei is a well-known political scientist in China.

The views expressed in this article represent those of the author(s) and not those of The Carter Center.

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