Echoes of Rhetoric: Tracing the Ideology Behind Trump’s Return Through American History X
What Trump’s Return Means for U.S.-China Relations
Our team asked experts in the United States and China about predictions for the next four years of U.S.-China relations now that the U.S. election is over. The future looks difficult from both sides of the Pacific. There is near consensus that the resumption of a trade war and hastening of decoupling will unfold alongside arms build up regionally and between the superpowers. The latter is the result of the United States refusing to support allies while ensuring its own military might against China’s build up.
This also means a decline in people-to-people connections. Several scholars we asked expect educational exchange between the United States and China to come to a trickle. The one dissenting opinion is that of Madelyn Ross (former president of the US-China Education Trust) who sees more Americans studying abroad in China.
Although most expect trade conflicts to be the driving force behind deteriorating relations, Victor Shih points out that there are mitigating factors. Namely, 30% of Telsa’s revenue comes from China. Elon Musk and those like him making big money off their China connections may limit how far any trade war goes.
What does Trumps re-election mean for the general trend of U.S.-China relations?
Wang Dong, Professor, School of International Studies, Peking University
With Trumps re-election, the United States is likely to intensify its economic and security competition against China, thus bringing greater risks to bilateral relations. “Trump 2.0” will likely resume the tariff war against China, therefore seriously disrupting trade and economic relations between China and the United States. Unveiling his goal of pursuing a complete decoupling between American and Chinese economies, Trump has proposed revoking China’s Most Favored Nation trade status and phasing out all imports of essential goods from China in four years. New McCarthyism might again be on the rise and the element of racism might become more prominent in U.S. policy toward China. Predictably, there will be more unpredictability, uncertainty and instability in the China-US relationship. It is more likely than not that China-U.S. relations under “Trump 2.0” might increasingly slip into a new Cold War.
Xin Qiang, Professor & Deputy Director, Center for American Studies, Fudan University
President Trump’s China policy in his second term, as widely believed, will be tougher, extremer, more unpredictable and more confrontational. It is very likely that U.S.-China relations will witness comprehensive deterioration and systematic rivalry featuring multi-dimensional friction and tension. Driven and supported by the bipartisan and executive-legislative consensus formulated in the past eight years that China is a pacing challenge and crucial threat of U.S. global dominance, President Trump, in accompanied by hawkish officials, might turn to exert extreme pressure upon China. Such a set of policies, which had been interpreted and defined by China as “containment, suppression, and encirclement” in the name of “strategic competition,” will trigger harsher countermeasures from China. Overshadowed by probable intensifying confrontation, current cooperation between the U.S. and China ranging from maintaining regional security, handling global climate change, dealing with public health crises to fighting against international crime, etc. will substantially decrease and dwindle, if not completely stall or disappear. Worse still, without a chance to set up necessary strategic guardrails between these two nuclear powers, geopolitical risks involving the Taiwan question and South China Sea issue might increase dramatically because of an accident or incident. It is a wise decision for the two states, perhaps the whole word, to buckle up and be ready for a possible perfect storm, even though most people do not want to face it.
What does a second Trump term mean for Taiwan?
Sara A. Newland, Associate Professor of Government, Smith College; Visiting Senior Fellow for US-China Relations, Truman Center for National Policy
In his first term, many of Trump’s advisors were China hawks who advocated for strong U.S. military and political support for Taiwan. The administration’s symbolic support for Taiwan was unusually high: HHS Secretary Alex Azar became the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit Taiwan since 1979. A significant number of Republicans in and outside of Congress continue to advocate robust support for Taiwan, sometimes in ways that seem designed to provoke Beijing.
However, these impulses now compete with rising isolationism within the Republican party, as evidenced by intraparty disagreements over aid to Ukraine. This year, the Republican party platform did not mention Taiwan—for the first time since 1980. And Trump himself has suggested that Taiwan should pay the United States for its defense and (falsely) claimed that Taiwan stole its semiconductor industry from the United States.
Despite this uncertainty, Xi Jinping would have much to lose from an invasion of Taiwan. In addition to the devastating human costs of war, a conflict in the Taiwan Strait would be economically devastating for China at a time when its domestic economy is already struggling.
Nonetheless, U.S. policy in the Taiwan strait has long relied on a dual deterrence strategy intended to discourage Taiwan from declaring independence and to prevent Chinese military aggression toward Taiwan. If the new administration signals reluctance to assist in Taiwan’s defense, it will undercut the basis for a policy that has helped to sustain a difficult peace in the Taiwan Strait for over 40 years.
Taiwanese analysts watch U.S. politics closely, and Trump’s reelection is also likely to have important effects on Taiwan’s domestic politics. For instance, Trump’s election may spur higher domestic defense spending in Taiwan. Experts have long argued that this is a necessity for Taiwan, and that recent investments in military preparedness under the Tsai and Lai administrations, while an important first step, have not gone far enough. An unreliable partner in Washington may push Taiwan to continue to improve its own military preparedness.
What does Trump's election mean for nuclear policy between the United States and China?
Lyle J. Morris, Senior Fellow on Foreign Policy and National Security, Center for China Analysis, Asia Society
Trump will likely approach nuclear policy with China in the same way he did during his first tenure – with a heavy dose of hard power buttressed by general disregard for arms control and non-proliferation with Beijing.
Trump ushered in the era of “strategic competition” with China. This competition will continue under Trump 2.0, to likely include all levers of societal, economic, and military spheres.
Given that China has largely refused U.S. entreaties for arms control talks with Beijing, Trump will have his hands tied by Beijing’s intransigence. But that might suit Trump just fine, as he exhibited little appetite for arms control with Russia, for example, from 2016-20.
Let’s not forget that under Trump, the United States withdrew from the 1992 Open Skies Treaty; failed to reach an agreement with Russia to extend New START (the only treaty regulating strategic nuclear weapons in the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals); and withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.
With New START due to expire in February 2026, a dangerous three-way nuclear arms race between Moscow, Beijing and Washington may be on the horizon.
Either way, with Trump’s unpredictable and capricious policy-making style, the odds that the United States and China will continue towards an incipient arms competition towards a full-fledged arms race are high.
Tong Zhao, Senior Fellow, Carnegie China, Nuclear Policy Program
Trump’s administration would probably place greater emphasis on responding to China’s nuclear buildup, with Chinese nuclear capabilities likely featuring prominently in any new Nuclear Posture Review. Trump might pursue a dual-track strategy: publicly demonstrating resolve to strengthen America’s nuclear capabilities while intensifying diplomatic pressure on Beijing to join arms control negotiations. While Trump may believe such assertive posturing could compel Beijing to negotiate, his advisors could be more skeptical of diplomatic success and more firmly committed to expanding U.S. nuclear capabilities. Some might even support resuming nuclear testing to demonstrate American resolve and deter Beijing.
Beijing appears to severely underestimate both the risk of a nuclear arms race and the importance of greater transparency and self-restraint in its nuclear policy as a measure of reassurance. If Washington begins expanding its nuclear arsenal, Chinese experts are unlikely to dismiss this as militarily insignificant or advocate for calm. Both nations risk knowingly entering a nuclear arms race.
The situation is further complicated by regional dynamics. Trump’s uncertain commitment to allies, combined with North Korea’s expanding nuclear and missile programs, could intensify South Korean deliberations about developing nuclear weapons. Should South Korea pursue this path, Japan would likely respond by either increasing its reliance on American nuclear weapons or considering its own nuclear deterrent—creating unprecedented security challenges for China. Given Trump’s history of engagement with Kim Jong-un and possible interest in renewed dialogue, Beijing may face a narrowing window of opportunity to help broker limits on North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and preserve regional stability.
How will Trump's return to the White House impact the educational exchange between China and the United States?
Kyle A. Jaros, Associate Professor, Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame
Academic exchange and cooperation between the United States and China, already far more restricted than a decade ago, is likely to diminish further under a second Trump presidency. Discourse about extreme—even existential—economic, political, and security threats from China has been central to the MAGA movement from early on. Under the first Trump administration, anti-China policies and rhetoric surged and, sadly but predictably, anti-Asian hate incidents spiked as well. As Trump’s Department of Justice pursued a China Initiative targeting university researchers with China links, many faculty and students of Chinese nationality and ethnicity felt scapegoated and unsafe. Although the Biden administration distanced itself from the Trump administration’s xenophobic rhetoric, federal policymakers continued to sharpen their scrutiny of academic cooperation with China, while state governments across the country—most notably, in Florida—also imposed a bevy of new restrictions on their universities’ engagement with China.
As a second Trump administration enters office, federal and state-level policies are likely to become more inhospitable still to students and researchers of Chinese origin. This could take various forms: a further increase in visa denials and border interrogations for Chinese students and researchers, new legislation or executive orders aimed at limiting China-related activities by US universities receiving federal funds, or a revival or expansion of China Initiative-style law enforcement efforts. International student numbers from China, which have already dropped substantially compared with a decade ago, will likely decline further as Chinese families consider their options. It could grow harder for US students and researchers to visit China as well—whether due to reactive measures on the Chinese side or due to added restrictions on the US side.
Lei Guang, So Family Executive Director, 21st Century China Center, GPS UC San Diego
Under a second Trump administration, educational exchanges between the United States and China are likely to encounter new obstacles, with both policy ambiguity and geopolitical tensions contributing to the uncertainty.
While Trump has suggested a potential pivot toward retaining more international STEM talent by offering an easier path to green cards, his broader anti-immigration rhetoric and record from his first term signal potential challenges. During his previous presidency, according to new research in 2022, his policies led to a 12% decline in Chinese student arrivals relative to other leading countries, largely due to increased visa restrictions, longer processing times, and heightened security checks. Furthermore, the Department of Justice’s “China Initiative” had a chilling effect on Chinese scholars and students, suggesting that a renewed emphasis on anti-China policies could further deter Chinese nationals.
On the Chinese side, factors such as an economic slowdown and rising nationalism may also lead to fewer students choosing the United States, especially as the United States enforces restrictions on STEM and tech fields in response to national security concerns. In this context, U.S.-China educational exchange may well depend on how Trump’s policy unfolds amid the influence of competing factions within his administration. On one hand, “China hawks” may push for stringent controls on student visas, seeing education as a national security vulnerability. On the other, realists who advocate for a moderated relationship could argue for selective engagement, understanding that educational ties can be stabilizing. Realists would also want to compete for Chinese talents. Meanwhile, “America First” advisors might prefer to restrict foreign students’ access to job markets in favor of U.S. citizens. The ultimate direction will likely hinge on which group dominates Trump’s policy agenda on international education.
To help sustain educational exchanges, U.S. and Chinese education organizations should prioritize institutional partnerships and explore virtual exchanges where possible. People-to-people diplomacy remains critical, and education organizations could work to keep these channels open by advocating for streamlined visa processes and post-graduation internship or even employment opportunities. This approach could help mitigate the effects of political tensions and preserve a foundation for more exchange in education.
Madelyn Ross, President Emeritus, U.S.-China Education Trust
While Trump’s past statements about China range from admiring to hostile, his first term as president had a strongly negative affect on educational exchanges. During his second term, the worst may be over, at least in some areas.
The flow of Chinese students and scholars to the United States will remain significantly lower than the high of more than 370,000 in 2018-19, regardless of the direction of U.S.-China relations. China’s current economic slowdown puts foreign study out of reach for more Chinese families, while universities in China grow more attractive as they rise in global rankings. Chinese students who can afford to go abroad have many destinations to choose from and, given Trump’s past negative stance on Chinese students, they are less likely to choose to U.S. schools under Trump’s new term. Nevertheless, the number of Chinese studying in America is not likely to drop far below the current 290,000, second only to students from India.
The flow of American students to China, on the other hand, looks more promising. Study abroad is expected to grow in popularity while Trump is in office. The number of Americans going to China is already on the rise, albeit from a very low base following the pandemic, helped by the Chinese government’s recent pledge to support bringing 50,000 American students to China. In 2024, the first year of that effort, China reports facilitating short-term group visits of 1-3 weeks for several thousand American high school and college students. The challenge for the United States will be reviving the number of Americans pursuing in-depth study and research in China, given China’s sensitivities regarding foreign research, and the U.S. State Department’s continuing Level 3 Travel Advisory for China.
The age of flourishing partnerships between Chinese and American universities is over for now. Bilateral tensions and revised U.S. government restrictions have led some American universities to rethink their existing collaborations with China, and make new ones unlikely. And the damage done by the so-called China Initiative (2018-2021) to research partnerships will be long-lived. While some Republican hawks have called for reviving the Initiative, it clearly failed to uncover widespread economic espionage and did grievous harm to individuals as well as to important and beneficial research.
Other policies from the first Trump era remain in place, including restricted visas for Chinese in sensitive STEM fields and from institutions with links to China’s military. Will they be intensified? Trump donors from the business community, including Elon Musk, have spoken out about the contributions of Chinese talent to America’s innovation ecosystem, which may have a balancing effect. And American universities are likely to meet new challenges with a renewed commitment to protecting their international students and scholars as well as to maximizing global education in a post-pandemic world. Trump’s bifurcated approach to China makes predictions riskier than usual, but much damage has already been done and the outlook for educational exchanges is mixed. There is room for stability and possible improvement in some areas over the next four years.
What should we expect out of Trump's trade policy in his second term?
Victor Shih, Professor of Political Science & Director, 21st Century China Center, Ho Miu Lam Chair in China and Pacific Relations
To some people’s surprise, Trump won the presidential election by a significant margin. In addition, it looks like his party also will control the Senate and maybe the House. As such, he will be able to enact many policies he campaigned on, including a significantly higher level of tariff on Chinese goods. However, in the course of campaigning for the presidency, Trump has relied on significant financial help from some people with major financial stakes in China such as Elon Musk. Thus, the way that China policy unfold in the new Trump Administration may be more complicated than people had expected.
Looking at Tesla, which is the source of the bulk of Musk’s wealth, roughly 1/3 of its revenue is from sales in China. Perhaps more importantly, the bulk of components in both the Chinese made cars and even in those made in the United States come from China. Thus, Musk likely would not want bilateral relationship to deteriorate too much. Other Trump supporters have major stakes in Chinese software platform Bytedance or are providing services to Bytedance so they also would not want bilateral relationship to go on a steep dive.
Even in the national security wing of Trump’s support group, there is a difference between those who want a very hostile stance towards China, and those who would like the United States to isolate itself more from global affairs. For the isolationists, they would not want too much hostility between the two countries because ultimately China is still a major buyer of U.S. farm goods and energy which helps support isolationism.
How these different interests within Trump’s group will translate to foreign policy is anyone’s guess. I suspect the influence of these different tendencies will ebbs and flows throughout his administration, resulting in volatile policies. Of course, many global leaders, including Chinese leaders, have come to expect this and will calibrate their engagement with the United States accordingly. China has already shown its willingness to be strategically flexible by being one of the first countries to reach out to Trump to congratulate him on his victory. The next four years may well be characterized by episodes of transactional pragmatism instead of a tailspin toward worsening ties.
The views expressed in this article represent those of the author(s) and not those of The Carter Center.
