A Progressive China Policy: An Interview with Jake Werner Part 2
How Might China Recalibrate Its Policy Toward the U.S. if Harris is Elected?
Many analysts agree that Kamala Harris will likely continue the Biden administration’s foreign policy toward China if elected due to her roles in the current administration and shared vision of policy goals. After he met with Xi Jinping in August, Jack Sullivan told reporters that Harris has been a central member of the Biden foreign policy team, a leading figure, and part of the design and implementation of U.S. foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific.
However, during the recent presidential debate on September 10, Harris neglected key U.S. foreign policy issues in Asia, including U.S.-China relations, the South China Sea, Taiwan, and North Korea. She overlooked China’s growing AI industry, its ties with Russia, and regional democratic backsliding. This suggests that Harris’ China policy may not be fully developed. China could find itself in a reactive position if it does not recalibrate its foreign policy toward the United States once Harris is elected.
Why Does China Need to Recalibrate its U.S. Policy?
American foreign policy development is largely based on public opinion. According to a Pew Research poll, China is a top foreign policy concern for approximately half of Americans. The majority of American people are worried about China’s influence on the global stage. More than 40 percent of Americans view China as the United States’ No. 1 enemy, indicating the growing tension between the two nations.
Despite deep political divisions in the United States, American public opinion drives Republican and Democratic parties to form a rare bipartisan consensus—a cohesive approach and tougher policy toward China, the only competitor with the intent, will, and capability to challenge the United States. This unified stance reflects a strategic shift to counter China’s growing global influence and protect American interests.
In the United States, the President is pivotal in executing foreign policy, but Congress, as the legislative branch, shapes American foreign policy by enacting laws and resolutions that guide the President’s actions. Once Congress sets the tone and direction of foreign policy, the President implements them, maintaining a balanced approach to governance
Congress took an unprecedented step during China Week in September, introducing over 20 China-related bills addressing nearly every major area of competition, including trade, farm ownership, and electric vehicles, as well as countering Chinese propaganda abroad. These bills underscore the perceived national security threat posed by China and also portray the Biden administration as not adequately addressing China’s expanding influence, aiming to create a comprehensive framework for U.S. China policy and empower the next president to navigate the strategic rivalry with Beijing more effectively.
The CCP’s mouthpiece, the Global Times, published an article claiming that these legislative actions are designed to score political points by weaponizing China-related issues and obstructing China’s development, weakening China’s role in global supply chains, and undermining the Biden administration’s efforts to stabilize U.S.-China relations
Harris must distinguish herself from Biden by taking a tougher stance on China. She should clearly outline her China policy before entering the White House and begin executing it decisively within her first 100 days, focusing on key issues to demonstrate her commitment to protecting American interests and maintaining strong global leadership. Any suggestion that Harris needs, or hope that she will have, an ice-breaking trip to Beijing as Nixon did 50 years ago is unrealistic if she is elected.
A Third Way of Harris’s Approach Toward China
Kamala Harris met with Chinese President Xi Jinping on November 19, 2022, during the APEC summit in Bangkok, Thailand. Such meetings can be valuable opportunities to foster open communication, reduce misunderstandings, promote a more cooperative atmosphere, and allow both leaders to address sensitive issues directly.
However, Harris will face strong domestic pressure. As vice president, she has already navigated significant domestic challenges related to China, especially concerning economic and national security issues. With a majority of Americans viewing China as the top foreign policy concern, this has influenced her administration’s cautious but firm stance on China, potentially leading to more aggressive policies.
Harris’ potential China policy could represent a “third way,” aiming to balance engagement and competition without adopting Biden’s perceived weaknesses or Trump’s confrontational strategies. Harris has indicated a preference for a “de-risk” approach towards China rather than full decoupling. Under her leadership, the United States would likely seek to reduce vulnerabilities without completely severing economic ties. This nuanced shift in policy could prompt China to reassess its strategy, engaging with the United States in a way that mitigates risks while maintaining beneficial relations. When Harris met Xi, she emphasized the importance of keeping open lines of communication to responsibly manage the competition between the two countries.
Trade relations with China form a crucial aspect of Harris’s agenda. She has criticized the Trump administration’s tariffs and their adverse effects on American jobs, claiming that the trade war resulted in a loss of 300,000 manufacturing jobs. Harris also labels Trump’s tariffs as a “Trump sales tax,” which suggests a potential shift toward a more pragmatic approach to U.S.-China trade relations by focusing on reducing economic strain while still addressing trade imbalances.
Harris has previously expressed a willingness to work with China on climate issues. Given the global nature of climate change, collaboration between the two largest carbon emitters could be crucial for making significant progress. She might seek ways to balance these efforts with opportunities for economic cooperation, potentially easing some tariffs or negotiating new trade agreements.
Harris might support the EV industry even more than Biden, given her strong focus on climate change, environmental justice, and creating green jobs, aiming to accelerate the transition to clean energy and reduce carbon emissions more aggressively. However, there are serious doubts about whether the electric car industry could create opportunities for negotiation with China, especially considering the Biden administration’s proposed ban on Chinese technology from connected cars on U.S. roads. Even if she were to make necessary compromises in exchange for China’s commitments to provide favorable market access for U.S. automakers, she could not sacrifice U.S. national security. China might need to adjust its policies to align with a U.S. approach focused on stability and cooperative frameworks, even amid ongoing competition. Otherwise, China’s electric vehicle industry could face significant setbacks.
A Tougher Competition Is Ahead
China has explicitly rejected the characterization of its relationship with the United States as one of great power competition. China believes it is impossible for the two nations to be both rivals and partners. Chinese leaders argue that the United States’ emphasis on competition must be re-evaluated, urging a shift away from a Cold War mentality. By contrast, in her Democratic National Convention speech, Harris said, “America — not China — wins the competition for the 21st century.” To reach her goal, Harris will likely use China’s weaknesses as bargaining chips to maximize gains in various tough negotiations, which will inevitably intensify competition between the two giants.
First, Harris can leverage human rights issues as a strategic pressure point to shape the trajectory of bilateral relations. She has consistently advocated for actions against China’s human rights violations. In the Senate, Harris co-sponsored the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act and the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act. If elected, Harris will place significant emphasis on human rights issues in her China policy, aiming for a more proactive stance compared to Biden’s administration. This approach positions human rights not just as moral imperatives but also as practical leverage in creating a more favorable trade and diplomatic climate with China. She can also rally international support and create a united front against these violations, illustrate America’s commitment to human rights, and establish conditionality in trade and AI discussions.
Xi’s China won’t compromise on U.S. interference but firmly claims that China’s people’s democracy is a type of whole-process democracy, which works better than American democracy. China is expected to adopt a series of countermeasures to mitigate the impact of this tougher stance, including economic retaliations such as imposing tariffs or reducing imports from the United States to influence public perception. China might leverage the BRI, BRICS, and other China-led international and regional organizations to strengthen ties with developing countries and create a bloc that supports its narratives on human rights. China may also intensify efforts to undermine U.S. alliances in the region by offering favorable trade deals or developmental aid to countries in need, aiming to dilute international criticism.
Secondly, the reunification of Taiwan is a longstanding principle upheld by all top leaders of the CCP. Xi has taken a tougher stance on Taiwan, asserting that China must be reunified and stating that the issue of Taiwan cannot be passed down from generation to generation. He warned that China makes no promise to renounce the use of force and reserves the option of taking all necessary measures to achieve reunification. However, U.S. and allied support for Taiwan has made it much more difficult for China to accomplish this goal under the Xi administration.
Harris has repeatedly expressed commitment to Taiwan’s self-defense and indicated that the US opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
The Harris Administration is expected to reaffirm U.S. support for Taiwan, maintaining the longstanding “One China” policy while opposing any aggressive moves by China towards the island.
On the one hand, Harris could utilize Taiwan as a model for promoting democratic values in the broader Indo-Pacific region, reinforcing U.S. alliances with other nations facing Chinese pressures. On the other hand, this unwavering support for Taiwan may compel China to engage more earnestly on various fronts, as the Taiwan issue is fundamental not only to U.S.-China relations but also to her broader foreign policy objectives in Asia.
During China Week, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Taiwan Conflict Deterrence Act to deter further hostility and promote accountability by exposing these officials’ illicit assets and restricting financial services to their immediate families if Beijing attacks Taiwan. It grants the U.S. President the authority to pressure China significantly by requiring the U.S. Treasury to report to Congress on the illicit financial activities of senior CCP officials.
China is likely to adjust its policy towards the U.S. by emphasizing assertive nationalism and economic resilience. Beijing may increase its military posturing in the Taiwan Strait while simultaneously enhancing its technological self-sufficiency to reduce dependence on U.S. technologies. China could impose retaliatory measures, such as restricting market access for American firms and leveraging its position in global supply chains to exert pressure. China will likely intensify its global propaganda efforts to reinforce the One-China Policy and portray U.S. legislation as an infringement on its sovereignty.
Third, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has lasted over two years, and the future of the war remains uncertain. Despite substantial military and financial aid to Ukraine, the persistence of Russian aggression suggests a partial failure to deter Moscow effectively. Most recently, Biden and Starmer announced that they have postponed a decision on allowing Ukraine to use long-range Western-supplied missiles to strike inside Russia, which reflects a cautious approach aimed at ensuring stability during the upcoming U.S. elections.
Harris has the opportunity to showcase her determination to support Ukraine. Her approach will likely involve leveraging U.S.-China relations to amplify pressure on Russia while simultaneously demonstrating a robust commitment to Ukraine. She has met with President Zelenskyy multiple times and condemned Russia’s actions as crimes against humanity. Harris emphasizes the importance of global alliances and maintaining U.S. leadership in supporting Ukrainian sovereignty.
As Harris prepares to navigate the complexities of the Ukraine war, she can accelerate military assistance, including the expedited delivery of advanced weaponry, to bolster Ukraine’s defenses. Harris could solidify alliances with NATO and European countries to ensure a coordinated response to Russian aggression. Although it is not wise for the next U.S. president to take on both Russia and China, Harris has to hit more Chinese companies with new sanctions over the Russia-Ukraine War if China continues to support Russia militarily.
China and Russia are now closely aligned, with China viewing the Ukraine war as a testing ground for potential war over the Taiwan Strait and a preparatory phase for achieving unification with Taiwan through military force. Their relationship is characterized by mutual dependence, often described by the Chinese idiom 唇亡齿寒 (chún wáng chǐ hán), meaning “if the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold.”
Since Jack Sullivan’s departure from China, China has sent several high-level delegations to Russia, including military leaders. Colonel General Li Qiaoming, Commander of the Ground Forces of the People’s Liberation Army, visited Moscow to discuss bilateral military cooperation. Chinese troops, tanks, and other armored vehicles have also participated in joint military exercises in Russia’s Transbaikal region. Vladimir Putin is scheduled to visit China again in October 2024, indicating that China-Russia ties remain solid, and China will not allow Russia to falter in its ongoing war. The competition between China and the US in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war will test the diplomatic acumen of the leaders of both countries.
Conclusion
Historically, changes in U.S. leadership have prompted recalibrations in Chinese foreign policies. If Harris is elected, she is likely to emphasize a nuanced balance of engagement and competition rather than outright confrontation. However, China should not expect Harris to make the first move in altering the current U.S. focus on competing with China, which aligns with American public opinion, U.S. legislation, and the broader international political landscape. Any such initiative must come from Beijing, as the problem originates there. China may even face a more pragmatic yet firm U.S. stance. China will need to reassess its strategies, engaging in more strategic negotiations while balancing its assertive nationalism with economic resilience due to her anticipated shift in approach. Concurrently, China will likely seek to exploit any perceived weaknesses in Harris’s policy to its advantage, underscoring the need for both nations to navigate their complex relationship with increased diplomatic acumen.
Dr. Jinghao Zhou is an associate professor of Asian studies at Hobart and William Smith Colleges in New York. His research focuses on contemporary China, and U.S.- China relations. He has published six books and six dozen articles. His latest book is Great Power Competition as the New Normal of China-U.S. Relations (2023).
The views expressed in this article represent those of the author(s) and not those of The Carter Center.
