The Carter Center China Focus is grateful to Michael Cerny (University of Oxford) for data analysis and visualization and Haifeng Huang (University of California, Merced) for comments and advice. For all inquiries, please contact Yawei Liu (Carter Center) at yawei.liu@cartercenter.org.
Between March 28 and April 5, 2022, the Carter Center China Focus conducted a survey of Chinese public opinion regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Results demonstrate that 75% of respondents agree that supporting Russia in Ukraine is China’s national interest, and that roughly 60% of respondents support China mediating an end to the conflict. By examining the individual correlates of these positions, we demonstrate that higher education, more consumption of state media, and more consumption of social media are correlated with higher support for Russia. We also examine public opinion with respect to the conspiracy theory that American biolabs were discovered by Russian forces in Ukraine. Among those who have encountered the conspiracy theory, roughly 70% of respondents believe this conspiracy theory is accurate. Furthermore, we find that higher education and greater exposure to national state media and social media are associated with higher levels of belief in the conspiracy theory, and that women (and to some extent people with higher income) believe it less, while older people believe it more. Ultimately, the findings demonstrate the influence of the generally pro-Russia information environment in China.
Introduction
The Russian Federation began its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Since that time, the People’s Republic of China has affirmed its neutrality with respect to the conflict, abstaining from a vote to condemn the invasion at the United Nations General Assembly. At the same time, the diplomatic and media apparatuses of the Chinese government and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have expressed tacit support for Russia’s invasion. China’s representative to the United Nations Security Council, Ambassador Zhang Jun, recognized Russian interests behind the conflict, arguing that ‘a solution to the crisis in Ukraine must take the security concerns of all interested countries seriously.’ Spokespersons for the Chinese Foreign Ministry have also repeatedly blamed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for pushing too close to Russia’s borders and criticized Western sanctions. Furthermore, experts and commentators have emphasized the pro-Russian position of Chinese state media, including the People’s Daily and the People’s Liberation Army Daily, which have published a series of commentaries criticizing Washington as the ‘black hand’ behind NATO’s aggressive posture.
The Chinese government appears to have little direct interest in the conflict aside from upholding it’s strategic alignment with Russia against the West. According to a recent analysis by Maria Repnikova and Wendy Zhou, both affiliated with Georgia State University, ‘In diplomatic statements and social-media discussions alike, Russia’s war on Ukraine is rationalized [in China] as a necessary step for resisting Western (and mainly U.S.) aggression.’5 Nonetheless, Chinese public opinion with respect to the conflict in Ukraine is not uniform. Evidence from elite commentary and social media suggest that many in China believe the government should chart a course towards peace. As Yuen Yuen Ang, a professor of politics at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, observed in a recent essay, ‘rejecting Putin’s invasion and actively brokering peace in Ukraine presents a rare opportunity for China to repair its deteriorating relationship with the U.S. and Europe.’
To our knowledge, this is the first systematic survey of online public opinion in China regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (n = 4, 886). We find that 75% of respondents agree that supporting Russia in Ukraine is China’s national interest, and that roughly 60% of respondents support China mediating an end to the conflict. By examining the individual correlates of these positions, we demonstrate that higher education, more consumption of state media, and more consumption of social media are correlated with higher support for Russia. We also examine public opinion with respect to the conspiracy theory that American biolabs were discovered by Russian forces in Ukraine. Among those that have encountered the conspiracy theory, roughly 70% of respondents believe this conspiracy theory is accurate. Furthermore, we find that higher education and greater exposure to national state media and social media are associated with higher levels of belief in the conspiracy theory, and that women (and to some extent people with higher income) believe it less.
Survey Design
Between March 28 and April 5, 2022, the Carter Center engaged RIWI Corp., a Canadian survey company, to conduct a survey of China’s online population about the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. RIWI technology allows for the rapid capture and assessment of large samples of public opinion data by delivering anonymous opt-in surveys to Web users surfing online. Unlike traditional or online survey approaches, RIWI’s technology ensure that anyone on the internet in China has an equal chance of being exposed to the survey. Respondents were not incentivized to participate, nor was any personally identifying information collected. Data were collected using systems and servers outside of China. In total, the survey received a total of 4, 886 complete responses. The sample skews male and young, so survey data were weighted during analysis according to US Census Bureau projections of China. The resultant sample is representative of China’s internet-using population.
Three primary questions were administered in the Chinese language. Additional questions assessed the demographic characteristics of the respondent, including their age, gender, education, income, and media diet. To see the Chinese-language version of the survey, please see Appendix I.
1. Question A asked respondents whether they feel that ‘supporting Russia in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict is in China’s national interest.’ Respondents were given the option to respond whether they ‘Strongly Agree,’ ‘Agree,’ ‘Disagree,’ and ‘Strongly Disagree.’
2. Question B asked respondents what they consider China’s best course of action with respect to the invasion. Their options were ‘Provide moral support to Russia,’ ‘Provide weapons to Russia,’ ‘Condemn the Russian Invasion,’ ‘Provide weapons to Ukraine,’ and ‘mediate an end to the conflict.’ Approximately 4,000 respondents given an option to respond, ‘mediate an end to the conflict,’ while roughly 2,500 were not.
2. Question C asked respondents about their outlook on the conspiracy theory that Russia discovered American biolabs in Ukraine. Respondents could indicate whether they had seen the conspiracy before, and whether they believe it is accurate, inaccurate, or if they don’t know.
Support for Russia
Question A asked respondents whether they feel that ‘supporting Russia in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict is in China’s national interest.’ We used the term ‘Russo-Ukrainian conflict’ to describe the invasion to avoid prompting respondents with terminology used by Western media. Respondents were given the option to respond whether they ‘Strongly Agree,’ ‘Agree,’ ‘Disagree,’ and ‘Strongly Disagree.’ Results are reported in Figure 1.
In total, 75% of respondents indicated that they agree that supporting Russia in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict is in China’s national interest. Of respondents who agreed with this statement, 40% expressed moderate agreement and 35% of respondents expressed strong agreement. In total, 25% of respondents disagreed with the statement that supporting Russia in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict is in China’s national interest, of whom 14% expressed moderate disagreement and 11% expressed strong disagreement.
China’s Best Course of Action
Question B asked respondents what they consider China’s best course of action with respect to the invasion. Respondent options were ‘Provide moral support to Russia,’ ‘Provide weapons to Russia,’ ‘Condemn the Russian Invasion,’ or ‘Provide weapons to Ukraine.’ Results are reported in Figure 2. More than 60% of respondents indicated that offering moral support to Russia is China’s best course of action, followed by 16% of respondents who support providing Russia weapons. 13% of respondents indicated that China should condemn Russia’s invasion, and 9% of respondents indicated that China should provide weapons to Ukraine.
We also administered the question to the second half of the sample with the option ‘Mediate an end to the conflict’ provided. Results are reported in Figure 3. Since the option to ‘Mediate an end to the conflict’ is not mutually exclusive with the other options provided, we do not analyze them further. However, it is evident that the majority of respondents believe China’s best course of action is to negotiate peace.
Conspiracy Theories
Question C asked respondents about their outlook on the conspiracy theory that Russia has discovered American biolabs in Ukraine. Respondents could indicate whether they had seen the conspiracy before, and whether they believe it is accurate, inaccurate, or don’t know. We then subsetted the data according to whether respondents had encountered the theory and their perspective on its veracity. Figure 4 plots the number of respondents who had encountered the conspiracy theory prior to taking the survey. Approximately half (49%) reported that they had seen the conspiracy theory before.
Figure 5 plots respondents’ belief in the veracity of the theory among respondents who had not encountered the conspiracy before. Among this group, 51% of respondents indicated that they think the theory is accurate, 13% indicated that they think the theory is inaccurate, and 36% indicated that they do not know.
Figure 6 plots results among respondents who had encountered the conspiracy before. Respondents who had encountered the conspiracy before were given the option to answer they believed it to be accurate or inaccurate, but were not given the option to answer whether they don’t know. 72% of respondents indicated that they believe the conspiracy to be accurate, and 28% of respondents indicated they believe the conspiracy to be inaccurate.
Correlates of Attitudes
This section identifies the correlates of Chinese attitudes toward the war in Ukraine. The dependent variables are support for Russia, China’s best course of action, belief in the bioweapons lab conspiracy theory, and exposure to the bioweapon conspiracy theory. The dependent variables are all recoded to range from 0 to 1, so the coefficients represent the percentage increase in the dependent variable when the independent variables increases by one unit (in the case of dummy variables such as gender and media consumption, when the independent variable changes from 0 to 1). The omitted baseline for media exposure is interpersonal communication, so the media coefficients represent the degree of association between exposure to a particular type of media and the dependent variable relative to the degree of association between inter-personal communication and that dependent variable.
Figure 7 displays the results for Chinese support for Russia. The magnitude of the coefficient is represented by the dots and the confidence intervals are represented by the lines to either side. Please note that confidence intervals which cross the vertical dotted line at 0 are not significant correlates of support. From the plot, education and greater exposure to national state media and social media are associated with a higher level of support for Russia. Gender, age, income level, and consumption of local, commercial, or foreign media are not significant correlates of a pro-Russian position.
Figure 8 displays the results for actions in support for Russia without the ‘mediate an end to the conflict’ option included. Higher education and greater exposure to national state media and social media are associated with a higher level of support for actions more helpful for Russia. Although the coefficient is negative for foreign media, indicating that who consume foreign media might be less supportive of Russia, this correlate is not statistically significant. Gender, age, income level, consumption of local or commercial media are also not statistically significant correlates of support for pro-Russian actions.
Figure 9 displays the results for actions in support for Russia with the ‘mediate an end to the conflict’ option included. The results are qualitatively similar to Figure 8, but women are less supportive of actions helpful to Russia. Higher education and greater exposure to national state media and social media are associated with a higher level of support for actions more helpful for Russia.
Figure 10 plots the correlates of respondents’ belief in the biolab conspiracy theory. Higher education and greater exposure to national state media and social media are associated with a higher level of belief in the conspiracy theory. Women (and to some extent people with higher income) believe it less, while older people believe it more.
Figure 11 plots the correlates of exposure to the biolab conspiracy theory. People with higher education are not more likely to have seen the conspiracy theory, but those with higher exposure to national state media, social media, and interestingly foreign media are more likely to have seen it (likely because foreign media also discuss this conspiracy theory). Older people and to some extent wealthier people are more likely to have seen it, while females are somewhat less likely to have seen it.
Conclusion
With respect to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, results from this short survey analysis suggest the following about Chinese public opinion. First, the majority of China’s internet-using population feel that supporting Russia is in China’s best interest. Our results suggest that the percentage who agree with this proposition is around 75%, and that support for Russia tends to be strongest among those who are better educated and get their news about international relations primarily from state and social media.
Second, although this survey does not examine the motivating reasons behind this belief, expert analyses suggest that most Chinese see the conflict through an anti-Western (and anti-American) prism. This is supported by the majority of respondents who believe that Russia has uncovered American biolabs in Ukraine, a conspiracy theory which resonates with others about the origins of COVID-19 in the United States. For example, among those who have encountered the conspiracy theory before, 72% believe it is accurate. Among those had not encountered the conspiracy theory before, only 13% believed it to be inaccurate. Our findings suggest that citizens who are better educated and get their news about international relations from state and social media are more likely to believe the theory.
Third, and despite these pro-Russian positions, results of the survey suggest that a majority of around 60% in China believes the government should mediate an end to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In the absence of mediation, approximately 60% of respondents support China offering moral to support to Russia. Notably only 16% of respondents support providing weapons to Russia, a mere 3% more than those who believe China should change its current course and condemn the Russian invasion. Overall, higher education and greater exposure to national state media and social media are associated with a higher level of support for actions more helpful for Russia.
Overall, we find that people with more exposure to national state media and social media have a higher level of support for Russia. They also believe in the bio-weapons lab conspiracy theory more, which is consistent with the prevalence of pro-Russia narratives on Chinese state media and social media, including those about the conspiracy theory. Interestingly, people with higher education also support Russia and believe in the conspiracy theory more. A potential reason is that education proxies for political interest, and those with higher political interest are more exposed to pro-Russia discourse. Ultimately, the findings suggest the influence of the generally pro-Russia information environment in China.
