When Perception is Power: Countering China’s Courtship of Sub-Saharan Africa in the Trump Era
Trump As the (In)adverteant Harbinger of a New Transatlantic Security Architecture: Europe’s Autonomy as a Bulwark Against Chinese Influence
[The China Focus at The Carter Center, in cooperation with the China Focus at the University of California, San Diego, and the 1990 Institute, organized an essay contest in honor of President Jimmy Carter. This essay, by Xudong Zhu of the University of Aberdeen, received the Jimmy Carter Prize Runner-up. Read more here.]
Donald Trump’s presidency disrupts conventional diplomacy, leaving allies and adversaries struggling to interpret his intentions. His most incendiary position regarding European countries has been his pressure on them to achieve defense spending equivalent to 5% of GDP. Trump’s accusations of European freeloading and misplaced complacency provoked outrage in Western capitals. However, as the United States and its allies navigate an intensifying rivalry with China, Trump’s core argument that Europe must take greater responsibility for its own defense seems more like strategic foresight than transatlantic heresy.
The question of Europe’s military autonomy, long a source of diplomatic unease, has become more urgent. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a wake-up call, but China’s long game in Europe offers an equally sobering lesson. A Europe that cannot stand on its own militarily and economically is not only a weaker NATO partner but also an easier target for Chinese influence operations, economic leverage, and political manipulation. Europe needs long-term strategic resilience. And in today’s geopolitics, that resilience begins with a Europe that no longer assumes Washington will always pick up the check or the rifle.
Europe’s Defense Dependence on the US Is a Strategic Liability
At the 2014 Wales summit, NATO Heads of State and Government first agreed to commit 2% of their national GDP to defense spending.1 Even as the war in Ukraine rages, only ten of NATO’s 31 members met the two percent target in 2023. Although this number grew to 23 countries in 2024, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte admitted that 2% is not nearly enough.2 Currently, the U.S. accounts for 53.2% of NATO’s overall GDP but contributes 65.6% of its military spending.3 The European NATO members, in contrast, represent 40.6% of the alliance’s GDP yet provide only 30.8% of its defense expenditures. Trump’s demand that NATO allies increase defense expenditure to 5% of GDP is regarded by many observers as a frontal assault on the alliance itself. He has even gone so far as to consider not appearing to defend NATO allies that do not pay up.4 However, the fundamental critique is valid: Europe has grown too reliant on American military might, creating a lopsided security framework that is neither sustainable nor strategically sound.
The deeper issue, often obscured by Trump’s combative delivery, is that Europe’s dependence on U.S. defense capabilities has hampered its ability to act as a coherent strategic entity. This dysfunction is not merely a matter of fairness; it has real implications for global power dynamics. As European countries outsource their security to Washington, they lose the leverage and autonomy necessary to defend their values and interests on the global stage, particularly with the growing competition with China. Without having to worry about security issues, many European leaders only see the advantages that come with Chinese investment and trade. The potential strengthening of competitors is not always factored into their calculations because it has been “socialized” through NATO. The same logic has been pursued in the case of Europe’s relationship with Russia, with Germany, for example, overestimating the benefits of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline while underestimating its attendant security costs onto the country’s allies. Most European governments are incentivized to underinvest in defense, prioritize domestic agendas, and delay tough strategic decisions, while U.S. taxpayers and troops shoulder the burdens of deterrence and crisis response. Europe built its prosperity on a structure that now seems distorted: security guarantees from the United States, cheap energy from Russia, and China’s industrial chain. That might have been tenable in a unipolar world. It isn’t anymore.
The result? A transatlantic alliance where one partner (the U.S.) carries the lion’s share of hard power while the other (Europe) vacillates between moral rhetoric and bureaucratic inertia. This imbalance leaves Europe vulnerable not just militarily, but also politically and economically, especially in the face of China’s sophisticated statecraft.
China’s Long Game in Europe
Trump is right about transatlantic security, not because he had the answers, but because he asked the uncomfortable questions. What happens when the U.S. cannot be everywhere at once? What does Europe do if it has to act alone? And who fills the vacuum when the West is distracted?
The answer, increasingly, is China. The threat from China is not an artillery barrage. Chinese traditional wisdom advocates “subduing the enemy’s troops without any fighting.”5 In modern words, this is creeping authoritarianism—an incremental erosion of democratic norms, market transparency, and strategic independence through technology, trade, and diplomacy. Beijing’s strategy in Europe is not built on tanks or missiles but on infrastructure projects, corporate acquisitions, digital integration, and elite capture.
Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese firms have systematically expanded their presence across Europe, gaining access to critical infrastructures and incorporating them into Beijing’s geostrategic interests. In Greece, the Chinese state-owned shipping giant COSCO acquired a majority stake in the Port of Piraeus and transformed it into one of the busiest ports in the Mediterranean, as well as a logistical gateway for Chinese exports into the EU. In Central and Eastern Europe, Chinese investment in rail infrastructure, such as the Budapest-Belgrade railway project, is often financed through opaque loan agreements with limited oversight.
Despite increasing restrictions, Huawei remains embedded in several European telecom networks, particularly in countries like Germany and Hungary, where full bans have yet to be enforced. While some EU states have moved to exclude the company from their 5G infrastructure due to national security concerns, others continue to permit limited involvement, creating a patchwork of vulnerabilities within the bloc’s digital infrastructure.
Beyond hard infrastructure, China has also pursued “soft power” influence within European academia and politics, and some of its operations are in legally ambiguous territory. A CORRECTIV investigation pointed out that a Chinese physicist promoted the development of quantum technology in China in the process of cooperation with Heidelberg University. Due to an insufficient understanding of the coordination mechanism between Chinese academia, government agencies, and military departments, Heidelberg University initially regarded the cooperation as basic scientific research. However, in fact, the cooperation provided technical support for China to apply quantum technology to the military field, and the laboratory established by the physicist has been included in the U.S. sanctions list due to its connection with the PLA (People’s Liberation Army).6 More concerning cases include the April 2024 arrest of a Chinese assistant to Maximilian Krah, a European Parliament member (AfD), on suspicion of espionage,7 and the 2023 UK entry ban on a Chinese businessman who has connections with Prince Andrew, also due to espionage concerns.8 Together, these moves represent more than just economic outreach—they reflect a coherent geopolitical strategy. By entrenching itself economically, technologically, and culturally within Europe, Beijing seeks to gain leverage, weaken transatlantic consensus on China policy, and create a more favorable international environment for its rise.
A Europe that cannot coordinate its own defense, guard its economic sovereignty, or control its strategic dependencies is easy prey for China’s divide-and-conquer tactics. Washington knows this. So do many European leaders. However, without a robust capacity for self-defense and unified foreign policy, Europe remains structurally vulnerable. This vulnerability is China’s opportunity. And the only antidote is resilience not just economic or institutional, but strategic. Europe must be able to say no to Beijing’s coercive offers and yes to collective self-reliance. That means building a credible defense posture, investing in indigenous technology, and presenting a united front in global governance forums.
Trump’s Disruption Makes the Forging of New Transatlantic Security Architecture Possible
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked the end of Europe’s post-Cold War illusions. Although China is unlikely to pose a direct military threat to Europe, it can still influence the geopolitical situation in regions such as Ukraine and the Middle East by forming a “quartet of chaos” with Russia, Iran, and North Korea, especially developing “limitless” friendship with Russia, thereby having an indirect impact on European security.9In an anarchic world, as Dr. Kissinger put it, “Every international order must sooner or later face the impact of two tendencies challenging its cohesion: either a redefinition of legitimacy or a significant shift in the balance.”10 Accordingly, the rise of China aligned with a strong Russia would have challenged the U.S. primacy if not substantially shifted the status quo. Given this, the U.S. and the EU would make all efforts to converge their positions on the containment of the rise of China. Suddenly, “hard power” was no longer an abstraction. Sweden and Finland abandoned decades of neutrality. At NATO’s Madrid Summit, China was identified for the first time as a systemic challenge to the Alliance’s interests, security, and values.11 In Germany, Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared a Zeitenwende—a turning point in national strategy.12
To meet this moment, Europe and the United States must redefine the alliance they built after World War II. The old model of American primacy and European dependency is no longer fit for purpose. The new model must be one of mutual capability, distributed leadership, and shared deterrence. For Europe, this means accelerating defense integration. The EU’s Strategic Compass, adopted in 2022, calls for a strong rapid deployment capacity of up to 5000 troops by 2025.13 That’s a good start. But without political will, joint procurement, and sustained funding, it will be a paper force. Initiatives like the European Defense Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) must be scaled up and coordinated across member states. Though no longer a member of the EU, the United Kingdom continues to play an active role in NATO, especially as one of its nuclear powers. The speed and determination of the British response in the face of the crisis are impressive: Former Prime Minister Boris Johnson visited Kyiv in April 2022, only two months after the Russian army appeared on Ukrainian territory. Britain was also the first Western country to provide Ukraine with long-range missiles.14 With its special relations to both the U.S. and continental European countries, the UK has the potential to serve as a bridge for transatlantic strategic coordination. For its part, the United States must embrace, not obstruct, Europe’s drive toward strategic autonomy. That includes sharing intelligence, coordinating tech development, and encouraging industrial independence in key sectors. The U.S. should welcome a Europe that can act without always asking permission, because that Europe will be far more effective at resisting both Russian aggression and Chinese influence.
Both sides must shed outdated nostalgia. The transatlantic alliance of the 21st century will not look like the one in 1949. But it can be just as strong because it will be built on necessity, not sentiment. President Trump did not have a doctrine, and few would praise him for strategic subtlety. Trump’s delivery was often abrasive, and his threats to abandon NATO allies rightly raised alarms. However, whether Donald Trump personally supports NATO may ultimately be irrelevant. What matters more is that his administration, however tactless, has triggered long-overdue strategic recalibrations. For Trump’s future successors, it may be Trump’s critique, not his cooperation, that may create the potential for an alliance with a more balanced and effective distribution of responsibilities.
Europe’s autonomy is not a zero-sum alternative to the transatlantic alliance. The current debate lies in perception, not in principle. Europe’s pursuit of autonomy does not mean breaking away from NATO, but rather becoming a more capable and credible partner within it. The EU, for instance, can play a larger role in defense procurement, border security, and crisis management, while NATO remains the bedrock for collective deterrence. Autonomy, in this context, means optionality—the ability to act independently when U.S. support is delayed or directed elsewhere.
In the long struggle against authoritarian influence, a strategically independent Europe is desirable and necessary. Rather than weakening NATO, European autonomy can be its cornerstone.
Despite Europe’s obvious limitations: defense logistics are slow, coordination is patchy, and most battlefield support still depends on American leadership and hardware. The war in Ukraine has shown that when Europe mobilizes, it can play a decisive role in sanctions, refugee resettlement, and industrial ramp-up. As the United States competes with China around the world, an independent, capable, and autonomous Europe will be a force multiplier. This autonomy will give the United States greater flexibility and enhance Europe’s influence, enabling both sides to counter Chinese influence in the Indo Pacific, Africa, Latin America, and beyond without overspending on resources.
References:
1 NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government (2014),” NATO, accessed April 2, 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.
2 NATO, “Remarks by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte at the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Security and Defence,” NATO, accessed April 2, 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_232125.htm.
3 NATO, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2024),” NATO, accessed April 2, 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_226465.htm.
4“Trump Casts Doubt on Willingness to Defend Nato Allies ‘If They Don’t Pay,’” The Guardian, March 7, 2025, sec. US news, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/mar/07/donald-trump-nato-alliance-us-security support.
5 Sunzi, The Art of War (London: Folio Society, 2007).
6 CORRECTIV, “Der Quanten-Coup,” correctiv.org (blog), June 13, 2023, https://correctiv.org/aktuelles/china science-investigation/2023/06/13/wie-die-uni-heidelberg-teil-von-chinas-quantenstrategie-wurde/.
7“Spion für China? Mitarbeiter von AfD-Politiker Krah festgenommen – „Lage ist ernst“, mahnt Habeck – WELT,” DIE WELT, accessed April 2, 2025, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article251165928/Spion-fuer China-Mitarbeiter-von-AfD-Politiker-Krah-festgenommen-Lage-ist-ernst-mahnt-Habeck.html.
8 Kate Mansey, Assistant Editor | George Greenwood, Investigations Reporter | David Brown, Chief News Correspondent | Steven Swinford, Political, “Prince Andrew Invited ‘Chinese Spy’ into Buckingham Palace,” The Times, December 13, 2024, https://www.thetimes.com/uk/royal-family/article/prince-andrew-invited-chinese spy-buckingham-palace-qqpgsvvg6.
9 Natalie Sabanadze, Abigaël Vasselier, and Gunnar Wiegand, “China-Russia Alignment: A Threat to Europe’s Security | Merics,” June 26, 2024, https://merics.org/en/report/china-russia-alignment-threat-europes-security.
10 Henry Kissinger, World Order (London: Penguin, 2014).
11 NATO, “Madrid Summit Declaration Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government (2022),” NATO, accessed April 2, 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm.
12 Olaf Scholz, “The Global Zeitenwende,” Foreign Affairs, December 5, 2022,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/germany/olaf-scholz-global-zeitenwende-how-avoid-new-cold-war.
13 “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence | EEAS,” accessed April 2, 2025,
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en.
14 Peter Dickinson, “Britain Becomes First Country to Supply Ukraine with Long-Range Missiles,” Atlantic Council (blog), May 11, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/britain-becomes-first-country to-supply-ukraine-with-long-range-missiles/.
