The Dragon, The Bear, and The Eagle w/ Pavel Devyatkin

Henry Rory O’Connor: Could you give a brief background of China’s relationship with the Arctic and how it has developed in the last couple decades?

Pavel Devyatkin: Over the past few decades, China’s interest in the Arctic has increased and been shaped by economic, political, scientific and environmental interests. First joining the International Arctic Science Committee in 1996, China has long been involved in polar research and has conducted polar expeditions with its Xue Long icebreaker vessel. China established the Yellow River Station in 2004 in Svalbard, Norway, to conduct climatic studies and became an observer state to the Arctic Council in 2013, only allowing China’s participation in working groups but not in the negotiation of agreements in the institution. China declared itself a “near Arctic state” in 2018 with the publication of its Arctic Policy, a white paper that outlines China’s interests in the Arctic. The document presents China’s interests in scientific, economic, and governance activities in the region and calls the Arctic the “common heritage of humankind.”

HRO: What is China’s strategic interest in the Arctic, and how has the West reacted?

PD: The US and other Western countries have expressed alarm over China’s growing Arctic presence in strategic documents published by the White House, Pentagon, and various branches of the Armed Forces. There is especially concern over China’s cooperation with Russia and potential threats to the US. However, there is no evidence that China poses a military threat to the US in the Arctic or that China has aggressive military interests, or that China is pursuing a long-term military presence in the Arctic. China does not have the military-technical capabilities to conduct full-fledged military operations in the Arctic. Depending on how we define the Arctic, some of China’s activities (such as joint Coast Guard exercises, naval and air force drills) are not even within the Arctic Circle. The Arctic is not as important to China as the commentaries of many Western analysts suggest. China is still mainly concerned with regions closer to home, such as Taiwan and the South China Sea, and while China can be seen as a global strategic competitor, Beijing is not a peer or even near peer competitor in the Arctic. To overemphasize China’s role in the Arctic actually has the (unintended) effect of legitimizing China’s narrative about its place as a near-Arctic state with rights to the region.

HRO: Does China’s 14th (2021) 5-year plan represent a significant shift in Chinese arctic policy? What did it include about Arctic policy?

PD: The inclusion of the Arctic, Polar Silk Road, and Maritime Governance in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan is an important moment as it represents the first explicit mention of the region in such a document. However, it does not signal a dramatic shift in the plans already established by China’s Arctic policy, and while the 15^th Five-Year Plan has not yet been published, it is likely to include priorities related to climate adaptation and resource and energy security — with implications for China’s Arctic engagement. Earlier, China’s 2018 Arctic Policy outlines the country’s main strategic interests in the region, including scientific research to understand the unfolding changes in the Arctic, economic development (primarily shipping and energy activities), playing a role in regional/global governance, and international security.

HRO: What is the US’s interest in the Arctic?

PD: The US’s interest in the Arctic has ebbed and flowed with presidencies, but most generally, the US has prioritized homeland security, climate change and environmental protection, economic development, international cooperation and governance, and great power competition with Russia and China. The Arctic has not played the same vital security role in North America as it has historically for Russia and the Nordic states, but the current Trump presidency is emphasizing natural resources, oil and gas, and international security – especially when it comes to Greenland.

HRO: How do you evaluate China declaring itself to be a “near Arctic state?”

PD: China’s declaration to be a “near Arctic state” does not have legal implications, but it demonstrates China’s desire to be an active participant in the region and legitimize its role in the Arctic economy, governance, and security space. The label has caused controversy, most notably during the first Trump presidency when then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that there was no such category as a “near Arctic state.” We are seeing continued examples of this rhetoric during Trump’s current presidency as the President warns of Chinese ships “all over the place” and Chinese expansion into Greenland. This rhetoric shows a misunderstanding of Arctic security, as China’s security-related activities are nowhere near Greenland; more precisely, they are in the North Pacific/Bering Sea area. China has, however, expressed an interest in mining in Greenland, but these plans have not come to fruition.

HRO: What is the Northern Sea Route? Why does Russia care about it? China?

PD: The Northern Sea Route (not to be confused with the bigger Northeast Passage) is the maritime shipping route that runs from the Kara Strait to the Bering Strait in the Russian Arctic. It is about 3,500 miles long and is a potential alternative to the traditional Suez Canal shipping route, especially when taken in the context of events like the blockage of the Suez Canal in 2021 and the Houthis attacks in the Red Sea. Russia has been actively promoting the NSR as a key part of its Arctic strategy.
The NSR is attractive to China because it avoids the so-called Malacca Dilemma, where the US Navy controls China’s most important shipping route. China is building its relations with Arctic states, especially Russia, to gain access to the region’s resources. Natural gas and rare earth minerals are especially important for China in the context of China’s industrial development and move towards carbon neutrality. China also participates in Arctic affairs to further present itself as a great power capable of participating in global and regional governance.

Over the past few years, there has also been increasing rhetoric of a “Polar Silk Road” to integrate Arctic shipping into the Belt and Road Initiative. This initiative is combined with joint energy projects with Russia. Growing ties in the region are part of a larger trend that has been developing since before the ongoing war in Ukraine.

HRO: How significant is climate change in Arctic policy? Can climate be a part of cooperation?

PD: The US is currently shifting its priorities away from the climate crisis, but the crisis cannot be forgotten. The region is warming at a rate four times faster than the rest of the world. The Arctic is disproportionately affected by global warming: sea ice is diminishing, coastlines are eroding, ecosystems are collapsing, and there are existential risks to local communities and Indigenous livelihoods. The Arctic climate crisis is the “canary in the coal mine” for what awaits other regions. The transforming Arctic has direct consequences on warming and rising sea levels around the world.

Cooperation was fractured over the last few years, but now with the new administration in the White House, there are growing indications of US-Russia Arctic cooperation in energy, natural resources, and possible environmental issues. This may lessen China’s role in the Arctic, but it is unlikely that Russia would abandon its long-term strategic cooperation with China because of rhetoric emerging from the US. Trump has also recently threatened sanctions on Russian oil, so the Russian side is aware of how unpredictable Trump may be.

Climate change plays a crucial role in the growing accessibility of resources and shipping lanes, but the region would still be of global interest absent climate change due to its strategic location. For Russia, the Arctic is its whole northern border, making it particularly sensitive from a security perspective. Russia was invaded twice by Western troops through the Arctic in the twentieth century: by US, UK and French troops during the Allied Intervention into the Russian Civil War and then by Nazi Germany and Finland during World War II.

HRO: What is the role of multilateral organizations in Arctic governance? Have they been effective at managing relations?

PD: The Arctic has a slew of multilateral organizations that allow Arctic states, non-government organizations, Indigenous peoples, scientists, and other stakeholders to discuss issues of sustainable development, environmental protection, and regional governance. The Arctic Council is regarded as an exemplar of constructive post-Cold War diplomacy for its record in cooperation and international agreements that cover search and rescue operations, oil spill prevention and response, marine pollution, and scientific collaboration. However, geopolitical disagreements, especially over the conflict in Ukraine, have afflicted the productive operation of the Arctic Council and led the seven Western Arctic states to pause their cooperation with Russia in 2022. Together with Trump’s threats to acquire Greenland, not exempting military or economic coercion, these events raise serious questions about the future of Arctic multilateralism and the regional order.

HRO: Do Russia and China jointly cooperate with the West in the Arctic?

PD: China and Russia have been able to cooperate with the West in the Arctic Council, through agreements such as the Central Arctic Oceans Fisheries Agreement, and joint research expeditions such as MOSAiC. There are ample opportunities for all interested countries to commit resources towards the understanding of the Arctic climate crisis, joint sustainable development, and collaborative environmental protection.

HRO: How do we keep the Arctic peaceful?

PD: Cooperation is a good first step to keeping the Arctic peaceful, as it begets trust and can spill over into other fields of cooperation and trust-building, such as arms control and demilitarization. However, there is a dearth of meaningful security-related cooperation that is crucial for maintaining the peace of the region. This includes military-to-military communication, confidence-building measures, joint military exercises that include adversaries as observers, Automatic Identification System, and many more measures to improve transparency and safety of security-related activities. I have been part of many Track 2 events, where participants from the West and East emphasize the importance of restarting such activities, but the obstacles to restarting them are high. With the ongoing shifts in the international order, we may see both unexpected positive and negative developments in these areas.