Sovereignty, Security, & U.S.-China Relations

In late summer 2024, The Carter Center’s China Focus initiative collaborated with faculty from Emory University’s Department of Political Science on a poll of Chinese public opinion on a host of international relations issues in Asia. Below, you can find the executive summary and key findings. A PDF of the complete report is available for download at the end.

Summary

This survey finds that, while Chinese public opinion tends to be unfavorable toward the United States, most Chinese people believe that peaceful and friendly relations with the United States are important for China’s economic development. Although these results suggest potentially broad acceptance for constructive paths out of current bilateral tensions, this survey also finds majority support for alliances that would make such paths mutually difficult, most importantly Russia and Vladimir Putin. Furthermore, in several cases responses to country-specific questions across Asia indicate support for military coercion as an international relations tool, leaving open the risk that the metaphor of a new Cold War could become a reality.

A significant feature of the so-called new Cold War between the United States and China is the centrality of economic competition over global networks. At the policy level, this is expressed in Washington through protectionist policies on strategic sectors and the bipartisan use of tariffs on Chinese imports to the United States. Meanwhile, Beijing appears committed to an export-oriented economy while implementing import substitution strategies domestically, continuing what Washington calls unfair trade practices.

At the level of public opinion, there is a shared perception that economic rivalry is at the heart of U.S.-China tensions. One recent poll found that 66% of Americans believe China has an outsized and negative impact on the U.S. economy. Another found that 56% of Americans believe U.S.-China trade weakens American national security and that maintaining America’s high-tech advantage ranks second in popular goals for the U.S.-China relationship – just beneath avoiding armed conflict. Meanwhile, in China, the vast majority believe that the United States seeks to limit Chinese development and nearly half see U.S. international economic policy as a serious challenge to China’s internal stability. Enough evidence exists to consider that the basic terms of the U.S.-China rivalry do not emerge from each country’s misperception of the other but instead from a mutual understanding.

Where is the danger in economic competition? Another significant feature of the new Cold War is that it remains cold. However, China’s economic rise and rivalry with the United States have fueled nationalist ambitions and territorial sovereignty claims over Taiwan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and the South China Sea. New research shows that the Chinese public is equally open to forcing unification with Taiwan through war as it is to maintaining the ambiguity of the status quo. While reports of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in Chinese media have slightly increased the Chinese public’s support for use of military force in general and for unification with Taiwan specifically, American opposition to Russia in Ukraine tempered this support.

The point is not that the Chinese public desires going to war to realize their government’s foreign policy goals. Instead, as this survey shows, there is support in China for coercive military actions short of war that could escalate into proxy conflicts between China and the United States. For example, most Chinese people (79.7%) support maintaining the government’s border claims with India even at the risk of conflict. Elsewhere, most Chinese people (72.2%) support sending a peacekeeping force into Myanmar to uphold ceasefire agreements while a plurality (36%) indicated they would support military intervention if Japan altered its constitution to allow for offensive military actions. (It is important to note in this final scenario that most responses were spread across diplomatic options.)

The results of this survey should be concerning but should not be taken to indicate there is no way back from the brink. The United States is certainly no stranger to coercive military actions as an international relations tool. Instead, the chance for mutual understanding among Americans and Chinese people that current tensions are primarily economic, coupled with the recognition in this survey that peaceful relations with the United States are ultimately in China’s best interest, could serve as a path, however fraught, to a safer, more beneficial world for all.

Key Findings

• Less than a quarter of the Chinese public (23.5%) hold a favorable attitude toward the United States and its people.
• Most of the Chinese public (69.6%) agrees that friendly and peaceful relations between the United States and China are necessary for China’s continued prosperity.
• More than half of those surveyed (55.1%) believe that force should not be used against Taiwan under any circumstances while 1 in 4 disagree. When asked how long China should wait before using force to unify with Taiwan, the most common response was within 5 years (33.5%).
• The majority of the Chinese public (66.1%) believes that China should continue to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; a majority (80%) also believes that Vladimir Putin will respect China’s sovereignty and national interests.
• Most Chinese people (81.1%) believe that Southeast Asian countries should respect China’s sovereignty over the South China Sea.
• North Korea remains an important ally for the Chinese public, with 8 in 10 indicating that China should support North Korean stability and security.
• More than half of Chinese people (52.5%) believe the Taliban should be recognized as the rightful government of Afghanistan.
• Across multiple issues, the Chinese public approves of the use of China’s military as a coercive tool in international relations. However, this should not be conflated wit holding uniformly pro-war positions. The majority (72.2%) supports the People’s Liberation Army sending a peace keeping mission to Myanmar to enforce a ceasefire. A plurality (36%) supports military intervention if Japan changes its constitution to allow for offensive military actions. When asked how China should respond if South Korea developed nuclear weapons, the most popular responses were diplomatic protest (26%), military intervention (25.9%) and pressure North Korea to denuclearize (21.9%).