The Urgency of Strengthening U.S.-China Academic Exchange w/ Yanzhong Huang

Juan Zhang: You mention that predicting China’s policy shifts has become increasingly difficult. What negative consequences has this led to or will lead to?

Yanzhong Huang: The inability to accurately predict China’s policy shifts could lead to significant miscalculations in U.S. policy toward China. The consequences include endangered American competitive advantage through underestimating China’s technological capabilities (as seen with DeepSeek’s AI breakthrough that shattered assumptions about U.S. technological supremacy), unpreparedness for major policy changes (like surprised reactions to major changes like China’s abrupt abandonment of COVID-19 restrictions), and increased risk of conflict over issues like Taiwan due to miscalculations about Beijing’s intentions. This information deficit ultimately undermines America’s ability to make sound strategic decisions regarding China.

ZJ: There is a growing trend that anything related to China is often seen in a negative light or causes people to shy away. Some argue that the U.S. is experiencing another McCarthyism-like period, leading to a decline in interest in China-related studies among Americans. What are your thoughts on this perspective?

YH: Whether there is such a parallel today is subject to debate, but there’s evidence of a climate where engagement with China has fallen out of favor and hawkish voices have gained prominence. The discontinued China Initiative left lasting concerns among academics, and public sentiment has hardened with 80 percent of Americans holding unfavorable views of China for five consecutive years. This has created an environment where China scholars face pressure to adopt more hawkish positions to avoid being perceived as naive or compromised. This atmosphere has directly impacted research choices and academic engagement. The pressures weigh particularly heavily on Chinese American scholars, partly because they reinforce a troubling historical narrative that people of Asian descent pose a heightened national security threat. As Cheng Li, a longtime China scholar in Washington, reflected upon leaving for a position in Hong Kong, what was once considered an asset – his Chinese American identity – had become a liability.

ZJ: Geopolitical competition has put both countries on high alert. You mentioned some of the restrictions imposed by China. How would you convince the Chinese government to ease these restrictions?

YH: To convince China to ease restrictions, I would emphasize mutual benefits: easing restrictions on American scholars could signal goodwill, fostering people-to-people ties that both governments have historically valued as a stabilizing force. This aligns with China’s officially promoted people-to-people exchange initiatives.

Also, scholars often serve as informal ambassadors whose experiences could build bridges between the two nations, encouraging dialogue and reducing the risk of escalation in other contentious areas. Those who engage directly with Chinese society typically develop a more nuanced view of the country, countering negative stereotypes or oversimplified narratives in Western discourse. This could lead to academic work that portrays China in a more balanced light, indirectly enhancing its global reputation.

In addition, China has expressed frustration over U.S. restrictions on Chinese students and scholars, citing national security concerns. Easing its own restrictions could pressure the U.S. to reciprocate, potentially loosening visa policies or travel advisories that currently limit Chinese access to American institutions.

ZJ: What do you think of the trend where American researchers are increasingly citing one another’s work due to the lack of new primary data? How does this impact the overall quality of research?

YH: The growing trend of researchers citing each other due to a lack of primary data fosters a dangerous echo chamber, contributing little new insight to China scholarship. This cycle can amplify initial misinterpretations and reinforce analytical blind spots. In response, risk-averse researchers increasingly retreat to historical topics, gravitate toward less sensitive areas, or engage in self-censorship—leading to significant gaps in contemporary China studies and diminishing the overall quality of analysis.

ZJ: The article highlights the sharp decline in American students studying in China. How do you think this will affect the future of U.S.-China relations?

YH: The dramatic decline in American students studying in China (from 15,000 a decade ago to just about 1,100 currently) will severely impact future U.S.-China relations by creating an expertise deficit. This shortage will mean that future American policymakers and analysts will lack firsthand experience with Chinese society and even language skills. We risk a future where those shaping America’s China policy have never set foot in China—an outcome that serves neither nation’s interests. This knowledge gap will increase the likelihood of misunderstandings, cultural disconnects, and policy miscalculations, while reducing America’s capacity to engage with China effectively at diplomatic, business, and cultural levels.

ZJ: It is fair to say that many scholars from both countries share a strong interest in academic exchange. However, political headwinds on both sides have hindered these efforts. As for the US, how can the U.S. government and universities better support China-focused research and academic exchange without compromising national security concerns?

YH: Attributing access issues solely to China would be misleading. The challenges also emanate from within the United States itself. The U.S. government and universities could better support China research by distinguishing between legitimate academic work and genuine security concerns, rather than applying overly broad restrictions. This includes restoring the Fulbright program in China, establishing new research initiatives modeled after the Soviet Interview Project, developing better tools for analyzing partial information, creating protected channels for scholarly exchange, and securing diplomatic agreements to protect authorized academic research.

ZJ: You published several insightful articles during the pandemic. Now that the pandemic is behind us, many would agree that it has profoundly changed the world, for better or worse. As a global public health expert, what do you see as your biggest takeaway from the pandemic when you look back?

YH: When reflecting on the COVID-19 pandemic, several critical lessons emerge that will shape public health approaches for decades to come.

First, the pandemic exposed the critical importance of robust public health capabilities. Countries with resilient healthcare systems that could rapidly scale up capacity fared better. Early detection coupled with transparent information sharing proved vital, highlighting that strong foundational health systems are essential for effective surveillance, rapid response, and maintaining healthcare infrastructure during crises.

Second, the pandemic revealed significant gaps in global health governance. The uneven international response demonstrated that improving coordination among international organizations, governments, and stakeholders is essential for a unified and efficient response. The inequitable distribution of vaccines and resources underscored existing global health disparities that must be addressed.

Third, geopolitical tensions severely hampered the pandemic response. We saw how political divides impeded crucial data sharing, resource allocation, and collaborative efforts. Future pandemic preparedness requires mechanisms that encourage cooperation across geopolitical boundaries for the common good.

Finally, the pandemic highlighted the danger of misinformation in undermining public health measures. Developing better strategies to counter health misinformation, improve digital literacy, and strengthen trustworthy information channels will be essential for effective responses to future health emergencies.