Why Asia? There is extensive discussion on the significance of Asia to the United States (and the West). In their recently published book Lost Decade: The US Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power (Oxford University Press, 2024), two heavyweight American foreign policy experts, Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine, make the point directly. According to them, Asia is important because of the “data” it represents globally and China’s rise. Asia is home to 60% of the world’s population, three of the top five economies, 40% of global GDP, 41% of global exports, 37% of global imports, half of the world’s active military personnel, six of the top ten military powers, five of the nine nuclear-armed nations, and six of the top ten carbon-emitting countries. But more importantly, they argue, is the “continued threat China poses to the international order.”

These figures are hard-earned. Over the past few decades, the Asian region has been the fastest-growing and most peaceful in the world, a miracle in global economic history. The last such miracle occurred in Europe over 30 years before World War I. At that time, Europe also experienced rapid development, prosperity, and peace, leading people to believe that no one would resort to war to solve international issues or use violence (revolution) to resolve internal conflicts. But regardless of how much hope was placed in peace, war happened—not just once, but twice, and both were world wars involving many countries.

Now it’s Asia’s turn. Like the pre-WWI European nations, today’s economic development has accelerated the military modernization of Asian countries. Although economic interdependence has been achieved among Asian countries, even to a higher degree than it was in Europe, Asia’s peace is extremely fragile due to various historical grievances and current conflicts. Beneath the surface of economic interdependence, unprecedented competition exists between Asian countries, and real conflicts between nations often bring historical issues to the forefront. The conflicts among Asian countries provide “extra-regional” powers — namely, the United States — with an advantageous structural condition to dominate Asian affairs. Despite U.S. claims of aiming to achieve peace in Asia under its leadership, the reality is quite the opposite: Asia under U.S. dominance is rapidly sliding toward war.

More importantly, the United States is not actually “extra-regional.” The term “extra-regional” only refers to geography, meaning the United States is located on the eastern shore of the Pacific Ocean. But in terms of interests, the United States is deeply embedded in Asia. Since modern times, especially since World War II, the United States has been deeply involved in Asian affairs—from Japan to the Korean Peninsula, from East Asia to ASEAN. No country is as deeply entrenched in Asia as the United States. Especially since the 1980s, as Asia became the center of the global economy, the United States has increasingly become an Asia-Pacific nation, rather than a traditional Atlantic one. Thus, the United States’ desire to maintain “empire” (hegemony) has organically combined with its actual economic interests in Asia, creating a powerful motivation to sustain its hegemony while reaping substantial economic benefits.

The aforementioned authors, Blackwill and Fontaine, summarize the main reasons for the failure of the United States’ “Pivot to Asia” strategy in their book… Thus, the obvious conclusion is that after a lost decade, the United States must refocus on the Asia-Pacific. As we’ve discussed many times before, since the emergence of the “Indo-Pacific” concept, the United States has already established at least seven “mini-multilaterals” in the region, all targeting China. In various U.S. statements, it is always emphasized that these actions are meant to “contain” potential conflicts caused by China or to “prevent” war. However, experience shows that the direction is quite the opposite: U.S. actions are constructing an overall framework for war, and it is a global framework, at least involving “NATO,” an Asian version of “NATO,” and Asian countries. At the same time, U.S. actions have also triggered rapid strategic adjustments by Russia and North Korea, further shifting “flashpoints” to the Asia-Pacific region.