Interview with James Steinberg: The Significance of Strategic Reassurance for U.S.-China Relations

James Steinberg served as U.S. Deputy Secretary of State in the Obama administration from 2009 to 2011. During this time, he proposed the concept of “strategic reassurance” to deal with the US-China relations. He also served as Deputy National Security Advisor to President Clinton from 1996 to 2000. Now, he is the dean of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). In this interview, James Steinberg talked about the background of proposing the “strategic reassurance” and its significance for US-China relations, the expectations of US policymakers for US-China relations during the Clinton administration, anecdotes about US-China relations during his tenure in the administration, the current academic environment for China studies, and SAIS’s commitment to promoting US-China exchanges.

When you served as Deputy Secretary of State during the Obama administration, you proposed the concept of “strategic reassurance” to deal with the US-China relations. Why was this concept proposed at that time?

I believe we need to examine the overall trajectory of US-China relations. The basic framework of US-China relations, crafted in the 1970s when the United States began to reengage with China and ultimately normalize diplomatic relations, was established at a time when China was quite weak and economically backward. Thus, there was a significant asymmetry in both military and economic power between the two countries. The relationship was fundamentally predicated on the understanding that China posed no rivalry to the United States, either economically or militarily. The United States, for both security and economic reasons, had an interest in seeing China grow and become more capable, prosperous, and stronger. Hence, the general mantra of US policy towards China was that the United States welcomed a strong and prosperous China. However, by the beginning of the Obama administration, this had changed dramatically.

China has experienced significant economic growth, accompanied by advancements in its military and technological capabilities. Consequently, there was a mutual recognition on both sides that the foundational framework of the relationship needed adjustment to acknowledge China’s enhanced stature. It was not that China had become a peer of the United States, but rather a far more formidable entity in terms of its capabilities. This shift raised questions about how China would wield its increased economic, political, and military capacities.

As extensively discussed, when a power experiences growth or ascends, concerns naturally arise among established nations regarding the intentions of the ascending power. For China to be able to continue to be accepted and for the United States to sustain its stance of welcoming a strong and prosperous China, it was imperative for China to clarify that it intended to use its increased capabilities in a way that was not threatening to others.

As a rising power, China bore a special responsibility to offer reassurance to other nations about how it was going to use its power. This responsibility constituted the primary reason for the imperative at that time for the United States and China to maintain a constructive relationship. It was incumbent in the first instance for China to provide that reassurance, not just to the United States but to the rest of the world. In return, if China were able to do this, the United States should be prepared to reassure China that it continued to welcome China’s continued growth and prosperity.

What is the role of strategic reassurance in the Obama administration’s strategy of rebalance to Asia?

The formula was not used by the Obama Administration, although the basic idea was implicit in the overall approach.  The fundamental challenge is not unique to China. For these This problem is inherent in the nature of relations between states because intentions cannot be known. States must decide how to act in the face of uncertainty about intentions. We have all studied the work of our great mentor, Robert Jervis, and his contributions to the security dilemma and spiral theory. So, whether referred to as strategic reassurance or not, the question is more generally about how states respond under uncertainty about intentions.

Some people advocate a strategy of hedging, which involves preparing for the worst since we cannot know for certain. The problem with hedging strategies is that they can be self-fulfilling. By hedging, you take measures that appear threatening to others. So, my view at the time, and now as a teacher, is that if you simply rely on hedging, you’re unlikely to stabilize the relationship.

If strategic reassurance could be well executed by both China and the US, what do you think the US-China relations would look like? Would it be different from the current situation?

Dramatically different. I think that the current state of relations is precisely because at key moments rather than providing that reassurance, China raised doubts in the minds of many. Across various sectors, including security, exemplified by China’s activities in the South China Sea, and in the economic realm, characterized by failure to protect intellectual property, continued subsidies, and non-market economic performances, as well as the adoption of “wolf warrior diplomacy,” China’s actions have fueled uncertainty. During a crucial period when I served as Deputy Secretary of State, China, rather than accepting the invitation to provide that reassurance, demonstrated a notable unwillingness to address the issues that I suggested needed to be raised at the time.

What significance do you think strategic reassurance holds for managing the competition between the US and China today?

While it may be late, it is not too late to rectify the situation. Significant missed opportunities occurred between approximately 2009 and the end of the Obama administration. Although there was some progress during President Xi’s visit with President Obama, where some agreements in principle were made regarding the South China Sea and intellectual property theft, unfortunately, those agreements do not seem to have been kept on the Chinese side. Consequently, there is now increased doubt and a heightened sense in the United States about the nature of China’s intentions compared to a decade ago.

However, it isn’t too late. If China’s leadership were willing to step back and recognize that its actions, along with its failure to address the reassurance issue, have led to the formation of a broader coalition of countries—including the United States, East Asia, and Europe—that are anxious about China’s intentions, then we could potentially begin to return to a more constructive path.

You also served as Deputy National Security Advisor to President Clinton from 1996 to 2000. What were the expectations of US policymakers regarding relations with China at that time?

Well, I think it’s important to remember the context, which is that President Clinton took office just four years after China’s political turmoil in 1989, and US-China relations were in a very difficult position. President Clinton had campaigned forcefully on the need to include human rights in the US-China equation, in US-China relations. So, the early years of the Clinton administration were a time of significant tensions between China and the United States. The US was concerned not only about China’s economic and human rights policies but also its non-proliferation policy regarding the sales of nuclear-related materials to Pakistan and missile technology to Pakistan and Iran. By the beginning of the second term when I moved from the State Department to the White House, it became clear that we were in a very difficult period, and the ability to maintain a constructive relationship with China was in doubt.

We had just experienced missile firings across the Taiwan Strait in 1996, so there was a great deal of tension. There was a sense in Washington that it was worth trying to see if we could shift US-China relations onto a different trajectory. Initially, through a series of meetings between Secretary of State Christopher and his Chinese counterpart, Vice Premier Qian Qichen, we began to make some progress on certain issues, particularly on non-proliferation. Then, in early 1997, at the beginning of the second term, President Clinton decided to invite President Jiang Zemin to the United States to explore the possibility of moving in a different direction. The state visit was quite successful and reopened channels of dialogue. Of course, it was followed by President Clinton’s historic visit to China the following year.

So, by the end of that exchange in 1997 and 1998, there was hope that we could begin to work together more effectively. The key focus for the remainder of the administration was on trade and economic issues, resulting in the decision for China to enter the WTO. Although it was not completed until the beginning of the Bush administration, the negotiations were essentially concluded during the Clinton administration.

What were the expectations? Firstly, that we would have a more stable, less confrontational relationship with China. Secondly, that China’s joining the WTO would accelerate the process of economic reform in the country. The reform and opening up, which was already underway, would create more opportunities for Americans and others to do business in China and more opportunities for trade. The significant debate, of course, is how much we believed this would lead to political reforms in China. There’s been a lot of discussion about that, and I believe the most perceptive study of the matter was conducted by Alastair Iain Johnston at Harvard, who examined the record. So, it’s not just my own perception when I say that we hoped, in addition to economic reforms, that China’s entry into the WTO would also lead to political reforms. However, I don’t think the decision to allow China into the WTO was predicated on the conviction that this would definitely happen. It was more of a hope rather than the foundation for the decision. Of course, that hope was not realized for various reasons.

Under that context, I believe no one could anticipate the development of US-China relations to the current level, right?

I think that’s certainly the case. Through the Bush administration, even though I was not in it, there was a relatively constructive relationship with China. In the post-9/11 era, there was a lot of cooperation on counterterrorism, increased economic engagement, and certainly, at the end of the Bush administration and the beginning of the Obama administration, the United States and China worked closely together in dealing with the financial crisis of 2008-2009. So, at the beginning of the Obama administration, we were hopeful that we could continue to build on and strengthen the relationship. Regrettably, we weren’t successful for a variety of reasons. Part of it was a degree of miscalculation in Beijing, a sense that after the economic crisis of 2008-2009, the United States was weak, and that China didn’t need to be as responsive. China believed that it could move forward without the kind of positive engagement with the United States that had characterized the relationship up to that time.

In your career, do you have any anecdotes about US-China relations?

There’s so many. My favorite one is from when I was Deputy Secretary of State. The Bush administration started the strategic economic dialogue with China, which was headed on the US side by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, focusing mainly on treasury matters. There was also a separate track managed by Deputy Secretary Robert Zoellick. However, when President Obama assumed office, we decided to enhance the political and security aspect by forming a partnership between Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner, and Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton.

During the first meeting under this new arrangement, the entire group convened initially, but then we held a separate meeting at the State Department, focusing on foreign policy matters. This meeting was between Secretary Clinton and State Councilor Dai Bingguo. Secretary Clinton, at this meeting, brought out a picture of her grandchildren and said, “Before we start on the specifics here, we need to keep in mind the stakes here. As I approach these issues in US-China relations, I think about what can we do together to make this a safe and better world for my grandchildren?” During one poignant moment, State Councilor Dai Bingguo reached into his pocket and pulled out a picture of his own grandchildren, expressing a shared sentiment.

It was a moment of profound human recognition, highlighting the profound and far-reaching consequences of our relationship. It served as a reminder that amidst discussions of military balances, threats, weaponry, and fears, we must not lose sight of the immense stakes involved. For many of the world’s most pressing challenges, such as global economic growth, pandemics, and proliferation, cooperation between the United States and China is imperative. Remembering our responsibility to our grandchildren is paramount. That moment crystallized for me the human aspect at the core of high-level policy discussions.

How do you think a potential reelection of Trump this year would potentially impact US-China relations?

I actually don’t have any idea because I don’t think we really know how former President Trump would approach US-China relations. This is partly because during his own term, the pattern was rather confusing in terms of his expectations. On one hand, as we know, he adopted Trump tariffs and economic measures. On the other hand, at times, he appeared to suggest that he was prepared to make deals with China, even potentially around issues involving Taiwan. We know that a number of his advisors have a very tough attitude towards China, but I don’t know how President Trump himself feels. And, of course, we know that ultimately, it’s the president and not the advisors who make the policy. So, I would simply say that it’s hard to know with any confidence from what we saw during the first term, how a re-elected President Trump would approach US-China relations.

You have a dual identity as a politician and a scholar. How do you view the current trend of scholars who support engagement with China being gradually marginalized?

I’m not sure I’d agree with that characterization. I think that it is true in the political arena that there is a pretty broad consensus around a rather confrontational approach to China. Just a few weeks ago, Congressman Raja Krishnamoorthi, the co-chair of a House caucus, basically said that our earlier engagement was a mistake. That sentiment is echoed on Capitol Hill and in considerable parts of the political community. However, I don’t think that’s true in the scholarly community. I believe there’s much more nuance in the scholarly community. There is a range of views. Certainly, there are people in the scholarly community who believe that China’s intentions are to dominate the world and to establish Chinese hegemony, substituting the principles that we in the United States and our partners believe in with a China-centric order. But I don’t think that’s universal. I think there’s a pretty broad range of views in the academy, and there’s a healthy range of opinion.

SAIS has a long tradition of excellent scholars studying China. As the dean of SAIS, what role do you hope SAIS will play in promoting US-China exchanges in the future?

Well, one of the things that’s extremely important, as you know, is that we have a campus in China, the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, which is a partnership between us and Nanjing University. It is a unique partnership in the world of scholarship. Other schools may have programs in China, but none of them have programs like ours, which is a true partnership between SAIS and Nanjing University. In this partnership, our students study together in Chinese, take the same courses, and are exposed to the same teachers, both Chinese and non-Chinese. They also have the chance not only to be together in the classroom but to study and work together on projects outside the classroom. In terms of exchange, we were the first, starting in 1986, in the early days of the reform and opening up, and have the longest continuous program of that sort. So, we’re very committed to that.

In addition, as you mentioned, we have a very strong China program here in DC with highly distinguished scholars, including Professor Andrew Mertha, who heads our China and the World Center, David Bulman, David Keegan, a former foreign service officer who teaches here, Ling Chen, who focuses on political economy issues, Jonas Nahm, who works on environment and other issues in China and is now working at the Council of Economic Advisers, some teachers who are not in SAIS but are partners with us, and many others. So, we have a very robust program. We are deeply committed to addressing one of the most pressing issues of our time, not only in terms of bilateral issues, but also regarding China’s impact on various fronts such as trade, economics, the environment, energy, and public health. Ensuring the continuation of this tradition is a very high priority for us, as SAIS has historically been recognized as a leading institution on China and US-China relations, thanks to the contributions of scholars like Arthur Doak Barnett, David Lampton, and many others.