Ambassador Winston Lord: Reflection, Review, and Hope for U.S.-China Relations

Many experts refer to the current U.S.-China rivalry as the new Cold War. As a strategist involved with the great powers’ rivalry back then, what lessons can we learn from the Cold War?

There are some similarities between the two eras, such as global, major power, and competitive rivalries, both geopolitical and ideological. As in the Cold War, we must put a floor under our relations and avoid direct conflict with China. Thus, as we did with the Soviet Union with certain measures like the Incidents at Sea Agreement, we need guardrails and military-to-military exchanges to prevent miscalculations and accidents. It will be very difficult to forge arms control agreements like we did with Moscow, but strategic discussions can clarify doctrines and provide greater transparency. Thus, the just-launched nuclear talks with Beijing are encouraging. Summit meetings, so long as expectations are limited, are useful to explore each other’s redlines and core interests, and to propel and frame official exchanges at lower levels.

There are also major differences between the two eras. While China is aggressive overseas, it has not been invading countries or seeking to overthrow governments. There are huge and inescapable economic links between the U.S. and China. Thus, the Biden Administration is correct to “derisk” rather than “decouple” economic links, and not practice all out containment, as we did with the Soviet Union. This principle applies also to non-economic exchanges such as students, scientists, cultural, and media presences, which we should promote. These were much sparser during the Cold War. Nurturing alliances remains essential now, as then.

A key lesson to learn from the Cold War is not to react to our global challenge with thinking our adversary is ten feet tall and exhibit domestic hysteria and slandering. The Chinese have major problems, and we have greatly superior assets. We should compete with self-confidence, which is currently very difficult because of our toxic and polarized domestic scene. Indeed, to invoke the Cold War, we should treat the China challenge as a “Sputnik” moment to shore up our soft and hard power.

From the Trump administration’s trade wars to the Biden administration’s tightened efforts to restrict China’s access to high-tech chips, the cooperation element in U.S.-China relations has steadily lost ground. More recently, fearful of the dire consequences of a complete decoupling with China, Western leaders began to call their China strategy “de-risking.”

Do you think this approach to China is similar to the containment policy during the Cold War? Looking back at key moments of the evolution of Washington’s policy toward China from President Nixon to President Biden, does the current course need to be adjusted? If yes, how? If not, why?

As indicated above, there is a fundamental difference between the economic strategies of the two eras. With the Soviets, we had minimal mutual trade and investment. Aside from a few steps like a grain agreement, our policy was all out of economic containment. Our current policy of shielding only security-related areas (derisking) rather than trying to decouple them makes sense in principle. We have enormous mutual economic gains that we should not squander while we protect sensitive areas. The approach of small areas protected by high walls will be very hard, to implement, however, because of supply chains, third-country involvement, dual-use technology, and the perils of industrial policy.

First Trump, and now Biden, with much greater nuance and precision and support of allies, has changed the policy mostly followed by their predecessors. I don’t have the space to reject the faulty, revisionist critiques of “engagement”, but we did need an adjusted, firmer policy because of China’s and Xi’s increasing aggressiveness abroad, repression at home, and blatant interference in other societies. The Biden approach of “invest” (build up our soft and hard power), “align” ( strengthen alliances and friendship), and “compete” (based on these pillars) is sound. The big hole is the lack of a competitive Indo-Pacific trade policy because of protectionism. A big problem being fixed is our posture toward the Global South, which is moving from making countries choose sides toward an emphasis on offering better models and inducements. A big unknown is whether we can truly “derisk” successfully, given the complexities and special interests.

The Taiwan issue remains one of the most contentious issues in U.S.-China relations. You were initially involved with the U.S.’s policy on Taiwan. The long-time policy of strategic ambiguity has played an essential role in regional peace. However, President Biden has repeatedly indicated that the U.S. will defend Taiwan if China uses force. What is your take on President Biden’s pledge to defend Taiwan? In your opinion, is the policy of strategic ambiguity still the most effective one to maintain peace?

The bipartisan Taiwan policy of nine American Presidents is one of the greatest diplomatic achievements in recent history, and “strategic ambiguity” is an essential part of that policy. Stemming from diplomatic relations and the Taiwan Relations Act, and featuring the elastic “One China” policy, it has served to protect Taiwan’s security while it developed a dynamic economy and flourishing democracy. Meanwhile, we have been able to pursue inevitably complex relations with the PRC, as each side finesses the issue, albeit with tensions, for the long term.

Beijing is deterred from using force against Taiwan by many factors – the inherent difficulties, the risks of wider conflict, the economic fallout, the American military deployments and allies, the political suicide of the leaders in the event of failure – and the ambiguity of U.S. military reaction. Deterrence also includes assurances to Beijing that we will abide by the foundations of our policy. To switch to “strategic clarity” would destroy a half-century of “One China” policy, upend our relationship with Beijing, and give Taiwan leaders the green light to take provocative actions, assuring that we would come to their defense in case of conflict, no matter what the origins.

President Biden’s pledges on this issue were mistakes if not gaffes. They were quickly walked back by Administration officials, perhaps coloring, but not removing “ambiguity.”

Many experts agree that it is hard to significantly change the current course of U.S.-China relations. Do you think the nature of the bilateral relationship is different from what it was during the Nixon and Carter years? Is it more toxic and dangerous? While we aim to stabilize and manage this relationship, what area(s) would be easier for the two sides to work together?

The nature of our relations has evolved and changed fundamentally since the 1970s. During the opening and early years of diplomatic relations, our ties were mostly strategic, including balancing the Soviet Union, with little bilateral substance because of China’s weakness. The main driving force for changes has been the remarkable and speedy rise of China to become not only a regional giant but a global power, in economic, military, and geopolitical terms. This has produced the dynamic of competition between an established and a rising power. History has taught us the complexities, indeed the dangers of conflict, arising from this adjustment. As a result, we have seen inevitable ups and downs in relations in recent decades, with toxic periods of tension between countries with clashing political systems and national interests. But as our interactions have multiplied, we have also seen more areas of mutual benefit and cooperation, as well as more problems.

The challenge now, when there is great strain, is to avoid conflict, whether or not intentional, through communication, exchanges, guardrails, and rules of the road. Meanwhile, in addition to economic and geopolitical competition, we can and should cooperate on certain global problems. These are in our mutual national interests, not a favor to either side. And they cannot be eased or solved without the collaboration of our two giant nations. These include climate change, global health and pandemics, nuclear issues and non-proliferation, the global economy – and the newest one, artificial intelligence.

President Carter is at the end stage of his life. One of his biggest diplomatic achievements was to normalize the American relationship with China. Forty years later, then Secretary of State Pompeo declared that the U.S.’s engagement policy with China had failed and would never be revived right in front of the house where President Nixon grew up. Was the policy of engagement with China a strategic failure for the U.S.?

In a word, no. The process (more than policy), pursued for decades by administrations of both parties was not a failure, as misguided revisionists allege.

There was no reasonable alternative. Containment was impossible because the world would not go along. China, with its size and able population, would thus have risen as a power anyway, only with a greater chance of conflict and more tensions between us and other countries.

“Engagement” was not naive. Successive U.S. administrations hedged with a strong military and alliances in case our dealings with China grew confrontational. Moreover, we resorted to tough measures, like sanctions or military deployments, when Beijing was provocative.

Political liberalization in China was not the principal policy rationale of our policy. Nor was it assumed that it would occur. To be sure, there were hopes that opening China to the world and a growing economy and middle class would stir movement toward a loosening of the political system, based on this having taken place in so many other places like Taiwan (with obvious Chinese dimensions), South Korea, Indonesia, Chile, etc. This would be a bonus for our engagement but was hardly a sine qua non. Moreover, the long-term jury is still out – we have not necessarily seen the end of China’s political trajectory.

Finally, the engagement process yielded many benefits for us, as well as problems, including major economic ones, as well as cooperation on various global issues.

Certainly, a firmer stance toward Beijing has in recent years been required and carried out in response to its aggressiveness abroad and repression at home. This stronger posture should, nevertheless, include the exchanges, the “engagement”, of our two peoples, cultures, and economies, while allowing for restrictions keyed to genuine security risks.

If you make another trip to China, do you have places or people you particularly want to visit or meet? Can you share a few memorable moments about your time as the aide to President Nixon in the early years and later as U.S. Ambassador to China?

Because of my age, I have severely cut back on overseas travel, and doubt I will be able to visit China again. If I were able to do so, Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Soochow, Xian, and Tibet would be priority revisits for me. Sadly, most of the Chinese people with whom I interacted over the decades have passed from the scene.

For memorable moments, not only in the 1970s, but also when I later was Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State, let me direct you and others to my State Department oral history. It can be easily accessed at adst.org (go to oral histories and my name). This very long history covers my entire career, but the first page contains chapter titles to steer the reader toward the China material.

Among the countless highlights of my experience with China, all recounted in my history: The July 1971 secret trip with Dr. Kissinger. The beginning of hundreds of hours of Zhou-Kissinger talks, the most sweeping and brilliant I have ever witnessed. A private guided tour of the Forbidden City, followed by a Peking Duck lunch with Zhou, at which he discussed the Cultural Revolution. The tense negotiation on the wording of the brief communique, announcing the visit and Nixon’s forthcoming trip.

The public October 1971 trip was preparing the way for Nixon’s trip, most notably the tense drafting of most of what would become the Shanghai Communique. Also, the first visits to the Great Wall and Summer Palace. Nixon’s visit in February 1972. The historic handshake at the airport between Nixon and Zhou. The Nixon-Mao meeting that I secretly attended. The welcoming banquet in the Great Hall of the People, and the sumptuous one in Hangzhou. The Kissinger press conference in Shanghai rolling out the Joint Communique.

My arrival as Ambassador in November 1985, riding in from the airport with the American flag fluttering on the limousine. My countless interactions with think tanks and universities, most notably Beijing University’s “Democracy Salon” in June 1988. Travels to almost every province, most dramatically as the first American Ambassador to visit Tibet. Cultural performances and working dinners at the Residence, with Chinese officials, dissidents, and reformers discussing political reform. My wife’s production of the play “The Caine Mutiny”, with a Chinese cast and Charlton Heston as director. Driving to the airport for my departure in April 1989, with the first huge crowd of the Tiananmen events pouring out for Hu Yaobang’s funeral.

How are you feeling about the news of Henry Kissinger’s passing?

Upon the passing of Dr. Kissinger, I feel melancholy on two levels.

First, the world and America have lost a towering advocate for peace, and I have lost a cherished friend and mentor.

Second, it is sad to see how many people, in recent years, have forgotten or distorted or sullied his legacy.

In the 1970s he was the most admired American in his adopted country and around the world. In the wake of the constitutional crisis of Watergate and the distrust of government, he was key to holding this nation together and maintaining its international credibility. In addition to his historic role in relations with China, he stabilized relations with the Soviet Union and negotiated the first major nuclear arms pact; negotiated the end of the Vietnam War; brokered the first steps toward peace in the Middle East; and moved American policy in Southern Africa to support of majority rule.

In sum, during eight decades, he transformed America’s international role, crafted visionary volumes, counseled global and American leaders, and enriched the national and worldwide discourse. It was an astonishing record of savvy and stamina. I will miss him deeply. So will the world.