Chinese Experts on ‘Delusions of Détente’

Shao Yuqun

Director of the Institute for Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, Senior Fellow for the Center for Americas Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies

A consensus across the aisles in the U.S. is that China is its most formidable competitor. However, there are differences in how to deal with China at the policy level. The debate in Washington’s foreign policy community on this matter is intense. Professor Beckley argues that the U.S. should adopt a containment policy towards China. He believes this approach can prevent China’s strategic global expansion without necessarily leading to conflict between the U.S. and China. In my view, Professor Beckley’s perspective overlooks some crucial aspects. I will elaborate on two key points here:

First, if the U.S. were to implement a containment policy against China, it would only transform China into a genuine “enemy” of the United States, which does not align with American interests. Currently, China does not view “competition” as the defining framework of the overall China-U.S. relationship. The strategic visions of the two countries are significantly different, and their interpretations of the same terminology often vary widely. For instance, over the past six years, the U.S. strategic community should have realized that the U.S. government’s use of “competition” does not align with that of the Chinese government. While the U.S. often employs Cold War experiences to consider its policy toward China, China’s strategic community and decision-makers relate the experiences and understanding of the Cold War more to the Asian region. These experiential and emotional differences mean that when the U.S. cautions against a “Cold War” or “new Cold War” with China, the Chinese audience does not necessarily understand the true intent behind America’s messages. Similarly, if the U.S. government explicitly implements a containment policy against China, it will force China to treat the U.S. as an “enemy” rather than just a broad “competitor.” Does the U.S. really need such an “enemy”?

Secondly, many of the challenges from China perceived by the U.S. stem from emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence that are challenging existing social governance paradigms. China and the U.S. face similar challenges and seek ways to respond within their own societal and cultural contexts. Differences in policy choices and even conflicting policies are normal in this process. As the two most important nations in the world, they should jointly lead discussions, policy coordination, and cooperation at the global level regarding emerging technologies and new paradigms of social governance. However, the current U.S. approach simplifies some of China’s policies as “authoritarian challenges to democracy.”  We all know most of the challenges to American democracy originate domestically. If the U.S. adopts a containment policy against China, it will not only make it impossible for both countries to explore how to address the challenges posed by emerging technologies to social governance, but it will also halt existing dialogues and cooperation. This does not align with U.S. interests either.

Beckley responds: Shao argues that China will view the United States like an enemy if the United States contains China. But China already views the United States as an enemy. Jiang Zemin said exactly that in an internal speech in 1998 just months after President Bill Clinton visited Beijing to cement U.S.-China engagement and became the first U.S. president in history to publicly articulate the three Nos on Taiwan. I quote from Jiang’s speech in my article. For many more examples of Chinese leaders viewing the United States as an enemy—even at the height of U.S.-China engagement—I recommend readers check out Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell’s Foreign Affairs article “How China Sees America,” and the writings of Cai Xia, a former professor at China’s Central Party School.

Shao asserts that US containment will preclude US-China cooperation on transnational issues. But China is already withholding such cooperation. The CCP still won’t admit that COVID-19 emerged from China’s shores, let alone allow an international investigation into the origins of the virus or cooperate with the United States on preventing the next pandemic. John Kerry just visited Beijing hoping to meet with Chairman Xi on tackling climate change, but Xi instead gave a speech in which he declared explicitly that China would never condition its greenhouse gas emissions on the timetable of any other nation, rather China’s pollution will be determined solely by the country’s development needs. On major transnational issues, there simply isn’t much US-China cooperation to jeopardize. I would also note that historically, US containment hasn’t ruled out transnational cooperation—the United States and the USSR worked together to eradicate smallpox even as they jostled for strategic advantage.

Professor, Institute of American Studies, Fudan University

In the context of easing tensions, the author presents a very interesting perspective, suggesting that pursuing a new Cold War policy of containment towards China may be better and even more conducive to world peace and well-being than attempting a new policy of engagement with China.

The author’s reasons for his argument are as follows: First, historically, competition between great powers has primarily been settled through strength, and the idea that engagement and conflict resolution through dialogue and cooperation might be effective is often delusional and counterproductive.

Second, based on decades of U.S. policy towards China, engagement has not yielded favorable results and has exacerbated suspicion, dissatisfaction, and competition between the U.S. and China.

Lastly, the author argues that adopting a new Cold War policy of containment towards China is unlikely to lead to conflict or war between the two nations; on the contrary, it may promote healthy competition between them, which benefits global well-being.

The author’s confidence in his argument raises questions about why some people in the U.S. believe that pursuing a policy of containment towards China will not lead to more intense confrontation or even conflict between the U.S. and China, and why it will not disrupt cooperation in certain areas. Since the Trump administration took office, the United States has begun to view China as a strategic competitor, initiating trade wars, tariff disputes, and technology conflicts, resulting in pushing the bilateral relationship to its lowest point since normalization. This has led to concerns about the possibility of conflict between the two countries. The rapid deterioration of U.S.-China relations is not the failure of engagement policies but rather the consequence of the U.S. government’s shift from engagement to a more confrontational approach (although it has not been officially declared as containment or a new Cold War). In other words, since the U.S. government abandoned engagement policies and adopted a more confrontational policy towards China, U.S.-China relations have entered a turbulent and unstable period. This underscores that pursuing a tough policy toward China will unlikely stabilize relations between the two countries. It is not conducive to cooperation and may even lead to regional conflicts.

If the U.S. government continues to pursue a hardline policy towards China, and even openly initiates a new Cold War against China, implements comprehensive containment policies, and challenges China’s red lines on issues including Taiwan and the South China Sea, it is difficult to imagine any cooperation between the U.S. and China, and conflict is a possibility. The cost of a new Cold War and regional conflicts is unimaginable for the two nuclear powers.

On the contrary, continuing engagement, although it may not immediately resolve differences and disagreements between the two sides on issues related to ideology, trade, technology, and the Taiwan Strait, can at least prevent misunderstandings, make the competition manageable, and stop slides into the worst-case scenarios. Furthermore, engagement, dialogue, and mutual concessions may still reach partial compromises and cooperation on issues including trade, technology, and climate change, benefiting both nations and the world.

In summary, a policy of containment towards China and a new Cold War between the U.S. and China are detrimental to the bilateral relationship and a death knell for world peace and prosperity. While engagement with China may present significant challenges, it is a wise policy towards China in the long run.

Beckley responds: Wei argues that the downturn in US-China relations is America’s fault; it is the United States that supposedly abandoned engagement. But China’s more repressive and aggressive behavior began around the time of the 2008 financial crisis, and especially when the Obama administration was expanding the US-China strategic and economic dialogues, putting out a joint statement respecting China’s “core interests,” and pursuing a policy of “strategic reassurance,” as articulated most clearly by Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg. I would suggest readers check out Rush Doshi’s book, The Long Game, for an extensive analysis of the chronology of China’s turn to a more assertive policy, which clearly emerged before the United States became more confrontational under the Trump administration. Susan Shirk’s recent book, Overreach, makes a similar point. And I detail parts of China’s aggressive shift in a recent article in International Security, “The Peril of Peaking Powers.”

Wei argues that engagement can prevent misunderstandings, but the U.S.-China rivalry is not a misunderstanding; it’s a clear conflict of vital interests. The two countries see each other clearly and dislike what they see for logical reasons. They also suffer from what rationalist political science theories call the “credible commitment problem,” namely that concessions big enough to reassure the other side expose one’s own country to potentially devastating exploitation, thus making compromises hard to negotiate. I explain these points at length in my Foreign Affairs article.

Professor, School of International Studies, Deputy Director of Institute of American Studies, Renmin University

The views presented by Professor Michael Beckley in his article for Foreign Affairs are concerning, giving the impression that some younger American scholars are eagerly seeking what they perceive as a new Cold War for their generation in Washington.

While differences in systems and values between China and the United States have always existed, they have never hindered the improvement of relations and meaningful cooperation between the two nations. Emphasizing differences excessively, magnifying mutual suspicion, and considering them as reasons why the two countries cannot cooperate or engage with each other effectively are simply recycling outdated Cold War mentality. Such an extreme and backward-looking approach represents a self-fulfilling biased perception that repeats past mistakes, which does not align with the unique attributes of the unprecedented great power relationship between China and the United States.

Containing China will not benefit the United States but will cause harm. Containment will inevitably disrupt the stability of the most critical bilateral relationship in the world, which affects global peace and prosperity, and it will lead the entire world, including China and the United States, into uncharted and risky waters. Containment policy toward China will also fail to address any of the current challenges facing the United States itself, let alone provide the necessary favorable external conditions for the recovery of the U.S. economy, social healing, technological advancement, and other needs.

Positive engagement with China aligns more with U.S. interests and meets global expectations. The shift in rhetoric from “decoupling” to “de-risking” has indicated that the United States cannot completely sever ties with China, and cooperation between the two nations will persist in the long term. Effective communication on strategic security issues between China and the United States undoubtedly contributes to maintaining basic strategic stability globally and regionally, which the world welcomes. The United States has historically shaped its strategic culture around showing its superiority through shaping “others.” China emphasized “self-improvement and illuminating others” through healthy competition. There remains room for dialogue between the two approaches.

Chinese like to say, “You will get benevolence if you seek it,” and “what you sow is what you get.” Regardless of how often the “tragedy of great power politics” has played out in history, there is no inevitable path for U.S.-China relations to spiral into a cycle of confrontation. It is within human control, and the strategic communities of both countries should not be confined to Cold War narratives but rather should approach the relationship rationally, based on the principles of safeguarding the well-being of all humanity and pursuing the tangible interests of the people of both nations. This approach is essential for coordinating and stabilizing the relationship between the two countries.

Beckley responds: Diao claims I suffer from a “Cold War mentality.” But it is the CCP that is stuck in the Cold War. The menacing of Taiwan, the alliance with North Korea, the leaning to Moscow’s side, the cult of personality, the massive internal security force and prison camps, and the virulent anti-American and anti-Japanese nationalism were all features of Chinese policy in the 1950s and are present in modified form today. The United States tried many times to integrate China into a liberal global economy—almost the exact opposite of a Cold War policy—and yet the CCP never abandoned its revanchist aims or repressive nature.

Diao claims America must maintain communication with China to prevent conflict, but a month or so ago, China rejected US offers to establish military-to-military communications, likely because the CCP views any effort to stabilize the military balance in East Asia as an American ploy to freeze the territorial status quo, which the CCP has explicitly stated many times it wants to change, if necessary, by force.