Understanding China’s Recent Wolf-Warrior Propaganda

China’s recent wolf-warrior waixuan (外宣, external or overseas-targeted propaganda) attracts massive media attention and significant international criticism. For example, the present spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhao Lijian, has a long history of provocative assertions. For example, he promoted a conspiracy theory on his Twitter account that the United States military could have brought the coronavirus to Wuhan during the 2019 Military World Games. Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shaye criticized the West’s reckless pandemic control policies and repeatedly insulted French lawmakers, researchers, and media publicly for their political views. Lu’s aggressive and outspoken statements make him a famous diplomat in Chinese social media but angered French governments and societies. In an open letter, Lu said that if China really has wolf warriors, it’s because there are too many mad dogs that attack China under the cover of academic researchers and media.

Another recent example is the behavior of senior diplomats at the first Sino-U.S. summit in Anchorage March 2021. Both sides traded sharp rebukes of each others’ policies and condemned each other in front of the media. After the meeting, one U.S. official told the media that “the Chinese delegation … seems to have arrived intent on grandstanding, focused on public theatrics and dramatics over substance,” implying that Chinese delegates talked tough intentionally to please domestic audiences.

Wolf-warrior diplomacy and propaganda create international backlashes. Global views of China have become more negative, and the majority in every developed economy has an unfavorable view. The wolf-warrior diplomats have also caused diplomatic crises for their nationalistic and provocative rhetoric and gestures. Recently, Beijing was trying to soften its aggressive foreign policies.  In a group study session in June 2021, the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CPC) focused on an important subject – strengthening the country’s international communication. At the meeting, Xi Jinping stressed the importance of “adopting a narrative tone that reflects openness and confidence, yet conveys modesty and humility, in a bid to shape a reliable, admirable and respectable image of China  Xi’s words were widely interpreted as the first hint that the confrontational style in China’s diplomatic and media messages in recent years needs adjustment.

Understanding wolf-warrior diplomacy has strategic implications. For example, Beijing indeed anticipates the backlashes of acting provocatively and confronting the West (at least to some extent). From this perspective, a careful examination of wolf-warrior diplomacy and propaganda helps uncover how the current leadership weights the perceived risk and benefits. Furthermore, to what extent domestic gains could compensate for the losses by confronting the West will be exceptionally important. This article provides three possible explanations.

Individual Level Explanations

The individual-level explanations focus on the personal characteristics and motives to act as a wolf-warrior. On the one hand, the rise of Chinese nationalism has shaped the preferences and behavioral patterns of ordinary people and elites. Diplomats are more likely to embrace nationalistic ideas because They represent the nation, engage foreign governments continuously, and deal with important and sensitive issues. On the other hand, by acting as a wolf-warrior, individual diplomats could be known and welcomed by their superiors with whom they share similar beliefs and by domestic nationalists, which either boosts individual self-esteem or increases the chances of being promoted. The New York Times detailed how Zhao Lijian utilized social media to perform his duties successfully when stationed in Pakistan and was ultimately promoted to the deputy spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The effect of perceived rewards from superiors has impacted the decisions of Chinese leaders in the past. For example, a popular explanation of China’s economic miracle also centers on how the provincial leaders are empowered and incentivized to strive for higher economic growth rates to outperform others in the promotion review. Similar logic could apply to the studies of Chinese diplomats’ motives and behaviors. Moreover, further systemic studies could find out what performance indicators are to decide the promotion of Chinese diplomats.

However, scholars should be cautious about making such claims. The hidden assumption behind the individual level explanation is that wolf-warrior diplomacy and propaganda are standard practices of Chinese diplomacy. However, most Chinese diplomats are professional and cautious when performing their duties. In contrast, nationalistic and outspoken ones are exceptional cases. For example, Zhao Lijian’s outspoken tweets about the U.S. Army bringing coronavirus to Wuhan embarrassed Cui Tiankai, Chinese ambassador to the United States. In an interview, Ambassador Cui distanced himself from Zhao’s claims and told Axios on HBO that it is crazy to spread rumors about the coronavirus originating from a U.S. military lab.  He also refused to interpret Zhao’s tweets and referred to them as the opinions of a “particular individual” instead of a representative of the nation.

Institutional Level Explanations

The institutional explanations refer to the waixuan system in Chinese politics and the changes in its working doctrines, particularly under President Xi Jinping, focusing on the relationship between neixuan (内宣, domestic propaganda) and waixuan.

China’s waixuan system is part of its overall propaganda system, including neixuan and waixuan. In Chinese, waixuan combines wai (外, diplomacy) and xuan (宣, propoganda). The waixuan system falls under the joint leadership of the Central Commission on Foreign Affairs and the Central Propaganda and Ideological Work Leading Group. However, the institutional arrangements suggest that China’s waixuan are vulnerable to the influences of domestic politics. When China’s neixuan system becomes more conservative and does not allow the expression of different opinions, waixuan unavoidably gets more confrontational and nationalistic.

A more immediate change is the new working doctrines for the waixuan system since President Xi Jinping. Since the revolutionary period, China’s waixuan system has had a long tradition of “neiwai youbie” (conducting neixuan and waixuan differently). This doctrine is essential for the practices of waixuan. On the tactical level, Chinese leaders notice that waixuan targets different readers who are pursuing different objectives, publicizing different contents, and conducting researchin different languages, so the effective waixuan needs to be conducted differently from the neixuan.[2] [xd3]  On the strategic level, this doctrine highlights the fundamental differences between neixuan and waixuan. For example, one purpose of neixuan was to promote Party ideology and educate people, which was not supposed to be a significant focus of waixuan. In a waixuan working conference, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan said that “waixuan needs to prioritize the practices of ‘wai‘ (外, diplomacy) and downplay the elements of ‘xuan‘ (宣, propaganda). From his perspective, waixuan is diplomacy in nature instead of propaganda.

The recent critics against the doctrine argue that it is impossible to tell one story to domestic audiences while another is to international audiences in the information age. International media is increasingly interested in China’s domestic affairs as China grows more potent and influential, so the boundaries between waixuan and neixuan are blurred.

President Xi has developed new thoughts about the relations between neixuan and waixuan. Xi requested to “rationalize the relations between neixuan and waixuan” (理顺内宣外宣关系) and to “synergize the practices of neixuan and waixuan” (内宣外宣联动).

While I did not find further elaborations on the meanings of Xi’s appeal, such statements at least have the following implications. China should be active in fighting back against foreign accusations. It is justifiable to fight a propaganda war at the risk of jeopardizing China’s bilateral relations with a foreign country. What is more, China should be able to justify the rightness of “China Road” (中国道路) in the same logic to its people and the international community. Xi’s new thoughts make sense to some extent, but the side effects are that China was internalizing its waixuan. Beijing promoted nationalistic and ideological views to the international audiences and could not tolerate any severe external accusations or even different views.

Strategic Explanations

strategic analysts have been curious and worried about the foreign policy impacts of China’s propaganda agencies and practices. A focal point among all these concerns is the rising popular and elite nationalism in China and the convergence of the two in the recent decade.

Popular narratives believe that CPC is fuelling patriotism and nationalism in China to tackle its legitimacy crisis after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. Further analysis noticed the subtle relations between popular nationalism and elite nationalism. Political elites were fully aware that nationalism served as a double-edged sword. While nationalism helps the CPC rally popular support in diplomatic crises, uncontrolled nationalism would disturb the official agenda on economic development, undermine social stability, and even possibly escalate into anti-government street demonstrations.

However, in recent years, some analysts believe the popular and elite concepts of nationalism converged, explaining the practices of wolf-warrior waixuan.

For example, China commemorated the 70th anniversary of the Chinese army entering the Korean Peninsula to resist U.S. aggression and aid North Korea with a high profile display. By doing so, Xi sent a clear signal to the United States not to misjudge China’s determination and meanwhile rally domestic support for the government in the Sino-US trade war.

In an interview, Ambassador Lu Shaye appreciated Chinese netizens and the general public’s support over his propaganda war with France. He further added that “the standard to evaluate our work is not how the foreigners see us, but how our people see us, and whether our behaviors serve the interests of our nation and people…we cannot choose to do nothing simply because they (Westerners) will be unhappy.”

The spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hua Chunying, said at a press conference, “In essence, the criticism of ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’ is just another version of the ‘China threat theory’ and a discourse trap tailor-made for China. Those critics have been habitually condescendingly lecturing on China and still cannot take any refutation. They aim to preempt China from fighting back. By putting this label on China, they are threatening and blackmailing China into giving up its right to tell the truth.”

Beijing is playing the nationalism card by talking tough and acting recklessly to accommodate domestic nationalism and rally popular support. However, it is problematic that Chinese leadership has wholly embraced a nationalistic and confrontational policy agenda.

China’s recent wolf-warrior diplomacy and propaganda may be perceived to be temporary and unsustainable in Beijing’s strategic thinking. These context-specific factors, including domestic economic and social problems, the Covid-19 pandemic, Sino-U.S. tensions, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and other geopolitical crises in the region all contribute to a strong sense of danger. Chinese leaders may believe that China is fraught with internal troubles and external threats. Wolf-warrior propaganda is China’s acute stress reaction, which will return to normal as these problems become less urgent and severer.

Moreover, China still needs to and will contain nationalism, as it is still essential for China to engage the West to access high-technology and integrate itself into the global market. According to The Wall Street Journal, Chinese leaders have been considering how to soften its aggressive foreign policies since April, as wolf-warrior diplomacy only cemented anti-Chinese hostility around the world, particularly in the U.S., “in ways that risk isolating the Chinese economy”.

I believe that China is still in transition. It is still early and problematic to see China as an aggressive revisionist. Compared with 1990s China, Xi’s China is indeed more assertive. However, what Beijing believes is necessary is that the West needs to acknowledge that China is the second-largest economy with global influence and should reset its expectations of China. The future relations between China and the West will be characterized by a long-term process of confrontation, engagement, and mutual adaptation.